nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47his destruction. What Macnaghten did not know was that Hamza Khan
of Tezin and ’Amin Allah Khan Logari had a foot in both camps and kept
Akbar Khan briefed on Macnaghten’s double-cross. When Akbar Khan
realized what was planned he decided to set a trap that would finally expose
the envoy’s treachery to all his rivals.
On the evening of 21 December Sardar Muhammad Saddiq Khan,
Akbar Khan’s nephew, arrived at the cantonment and was ushered into a
private meeting with Macnaghten and Trevor. The conference was so secret
that neither Elphinstone nor Shelton knew about it, let alone were invited
to attend. Muhammad Saddiq proceeded to inform Macnaghten that Akbar
Khan had changed his mind. He and his father-in-law, Muhammad Shah
Khan, chief of the Babakr Khel of Laghman, were now prepared to allow
Shah Shuja‘ to remain as king on condition that he appointed Akbar Khan
as wazir. In return, the British garrison would be allowed to remain in
Kabul until the spring thaw. The British would therefore save face and with-
draw, claiming they had solved the Afghanistan ‘problem’. Akbar Khan’s
apparent change of heart, however, came at a cost. Macnaghten would
make an immediate cash payment of 30 lakh rupees and guarantee Akbar
Khan an annual pension of four lakh rupees for the rest of his life. These
terms were similar to ones proposed some weeks earlier by Nawab Zaman
Khan and held out the prospect of unifying the two rival Muhammadzai
factions and Nawab Jabbar Khan’s Ghilzais. However, the deal had a sting
in its tail: on the morning of the following day the British would signal
their consent to this deal by joining forces with Akbar Khan and attack
Qal‘a-yi Mahmud Khan, the stronghold of ’Amin Allah Khan Logari and
the Bayat Qizilbash. Akbar Khan even offered to bring the envoy the head
of ’Amin Allah Khan in return for a suitable reward.
Akbar Khan’s offer presented Macnaghten with a stark choice. He could
continue with the agreement he had already made with one Ghilzai faction
and join them in attacking Akbar Khan’s position in the Shah Bagh, or he
could change sides and, with the aid of Akbar Khan, destroy ’Amin Allah
Khan and the other leaders who had been responsible for the insurrection
and the death of Burnes. Akbar Khan’s plot was a superb piece of cunning,
for Macnaghten was caught in double check. Whichever of the two options
he chose it was bound to convince all parties that he would happily betray
them if he saw political advantage from doing so. The only way out was
to reject Akbar Khan’s plan, call off his own scheme to attack Akbar Khan
and publicly reaffirm to all parties that the British government remained
committed to upholding the 11 December agreement, since it had been
agreed by a jirga.