nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47Britain ‘would not force European officers or Residents upon him against
his wish’. 19 The Viceroy even ‘distinctly intimated to the Ameer that under
no circumstances should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist
him in coercing his rebellious subjects’. Mayo anyway believed there was
no immediate need for a British presence in Afghanistan:
with the friendly feelings that Shere Ali entertains towards us in
consequence of the assistance in money and arms that we have
given him, we may, without sending at present any European
official to Cabul, exercise sufficient influence over him to keep
him on the most amicable terms with us. 20Lord Mayo drew up an aide-memoire, signed by both parties, in which
the Viceroy assured the Amir that Britain would view with ‘severe dis -
pleasure any attempt on the part of your rivals to disturb your position
as Ruler of Cabul’. He also expressed the hope that Sher ‘Ali Khan would
soon establish his ‘legitimate rule over the entire kingdom’ and ‘transmit to
your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful
possessor’. 21 Sher ‘Ali Khan was disappointed at his failure to secure a more
formal agreement, but as Mayo admitted his wording of the aide-memoire
‘sailed very near the wind’; indeed some Ministers in London were very
concerned about the vagueness of its undertakings. Mayo’s actions were
eventually approved, but over the following decade the degree of commit-
ment made to the Amir in this aide-memoire was subject to much debate
and disagreement in British government circles, and between the Amir
and successive Viceroys. One particular problem was that the legal status
of Mayo’s letter was uncertain, for while it was not a formal treaty it clearly
had some legal status, since both parties had signed it and the Cabinet in
London had endorsed it.
As far as the British press was concerned, the Umballa Conference was
a triumph for Britain, but in Sher ‘Ali Khan’s view it was mostly a failure.
True, his expectations had been far too high, but the Amir had hoped
to return to Kabul with something more substantial than a letter and a
one-off gift of cash and guns. In hindsight, the Umballa Conference did
not mark the beginning of a new era of improved Anglo-Afghan relations,
but the start of a slow decline that would eventually lead to a complete
breakdown in diplomatic relations. The problem was that each side had
very different objectives. Sher ‘Ali Khan needed cash and arms to defend
himself against the Afzalids and had little interest in the British obsession
with a Russian invasion. Britain’s main interest was containing Russian