nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47mercenaries. In response Russia threatened to send its army across the
Danube to protect the mainly Orthodox Christian population of the
Balkans from genocide. In Disraeli’s view, this was merely a pretext for
Russia to secure naval bases in the Mediterranean, challenge Britain’s mari-
time supremacy and threaten its control of the newly opened Suez Canal.
As the threat of war with Russia in Europe grew, Disraeli feared Russia
planned to open a second front against India, either by occupying northern
Afghanistan or providing military assistance to ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan and
the Afzalid refugees in Samarkand. Britain therefore had to ensure that
it had a trustworthy ally in Kabul. Salisbury doubted Sher ‘Ali Khan was
the right person for this strategic objective and decided his loyalty must
be tested and that Britain needed to secure ‘a closer hold on the Amir’. 27
To this end, Salisbury renewed Britain’s demand for a permanent
British presence in Kabul and, if possible, in Herat and Kandahar too.
Northbrook strongly disagreed, arguing that such a demand was a breach
of the undertaking made by Lord Mayo in 1869 and pointed out that
on two separate occasions the Amir had turned down similar requests
on the grounds he could not guarantee the safety of British officials.
Furthermore, if Britain enforced this demand the Amir might well turn
to Russia. Salisbury rejected Northbrook’s view and in January 1875 he
instructed the Viceroy to place a British agent ‘with as much expedition
as the circumstances... permit’ at Herat and to take ‘similar steps with
regard to Candahar’. Kabul was not included in Salisbury’s list since he now
deemed it ‘too fanatical to be quite safe’. 28 In the event the Amir rejected
the ‘request’, Salisbury continued, Northbrook should send a mission to
Kabul anyway with or without the Amir’s consent.
Northbrook and his Council unanimously agreed that Sher ‘Ali Khan
would reject this demand and composed a studied rebuttal of Salisbury’s
position. They pointed out that the Amir had dutifully upheld the terms of
the 1869 and 1873 aide-memoires, refuted Salisbury’s claim that the Amir’s
refusal to admit a British mission was proof of disloyalty, and informed
him that if the Amir was forced to allow a British presence in Afghanistan
there was a high risk that the officers would be assassinated. As for Sher
‘Ali Khan’s correspondence with Russia, the Amir had dutifully shown
all of Kaufman’s letters to the Kabul wakil, who had forwarded copies to
Calcutta and the Amir had sought the Viceroy’s advice in his replies. In
conclusion, Northbrook hinted both he and his Council were prepared to
defy London by refusing to implement the new government policy. In a
private letter, Northbrook confided that: