nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47implacable’, but concluded that the only option was to ‘let sleeping dogs
lie’. 33 Relations would ‘drift on’ in the hope that the Amir would soon die
and his successor would prove a more suitable ally. Fear of political instabil-
ity and civil war, which might provide an excuse for Russian intervention,
meant Britain felt it had no alternative but to support ‘Abd al-Rahman
Khan and consequently he had a free hand. The Amir had called Britain’s
bluff and won.
Despite the bloody repressions, the Amir failed to prevent further
rebellions. In 1890 the Firozkohi Aimaq in the Murghab rebelled, followed
in the spring of 1892 by yet another revolt in Maimana. Both uprisings
were ruthlessly crushed and Muhammad Sharif Khan, the last Uzbek wali
of Maimana, fled across the border and asked the Russian authorities for
permission for thousands of Maimanagis to emigrate. His request was
denied but Muhammad Sharif Khan continued a cross-border guerrilla
war with the Afghan authorities in Maimana until he was eventually lured
to Herat by a promise of an amnesty, only to be imprisoned.
The Hazara WarsA far more serious revolt began in 1891 when the Hazaras of the western
Hazarajat rebelled. 34 Discontent with Muhammadzai rule had simmered
away in this region since the days of Dost Muhammad Khan. As a result
of expropriation of their lands, many Hazaras had been forced to pursue
menial work in Kabul and other cities, where they formed a despised
underclass of day labourers. The attitude of the urban upper classes to
Hazaras was exemplified by the Amir himself, who compared them to
donkeys. Prejudice increased during the British occupation of Kabul in
1879–80 after the Hazaras welcomed the invaders and worked on the
rehabilitation of Sherpur.
The catalyst for the Hazara revolt was the appointment of Sardar
‘Abd al-Quddus Khan, a descendant of Sultan Muhammad Khan Tela’i,
as governor of Bamiyan. According to the confidential Who’s Who in
Afghanistan, ‘Abd al-Quddus was ‘somewhat fanatical in matters of reli-
gion... a Tory of the most crusted type in politics, and an apostle of
Afghanistan for the Afghans’. 35 The appointment of such a hard-line Sunni
and Pushtun supremacist was about the worst choice to govern a region
where the population was predominantly Shi‘a and Isma‘ilis and of Turco-
Mongolian ethnicity. ‘Abd al-Quddus Khan and the Muhammadzai officer
corps in Bamiyan treated the Hazaras abominably, imprisoning or execut-
ing their leaders, disarming the population, helping themselves to Hazara