afghanistanIn the aftermath of the November Armistice of 1918 which ended hostil-
ities in the First World War, British diplomacy was focused on the Paris
Peace Conference, which convened shortly before Habib Allah Khan’s
assas sination. Initially the British and Indian administrations were unsure
even if the Amir had formally declared war on India, and were divided
on how to respond to ’Aman Allah Khan’s declaration of independence.
Lord Chelmsford argued for Britain to accept a degree of independence for
Afghanistan but Lord Curzon, who was now Britain’s Foreign Secretary,
refused to compromise. The October Revolution of 1917 and the heavy
losses of the First World War meant that Russia no longer posed a military
threat to India, at least in the short term. Curzon, though, was wedded to
the Forward Policy and reinvented the Russian threat in ideological terms
as the ‘Bolshevik Menace’. Lenin, he believed, was actively encouraging
India’s civil disobedience campaign and inciting the Amir to invade India.
Curzon therefore argued that rather than cede Afghanistan any degree of
independence, Britain should strengthen its control over the country’s
foreign affairs and severely restrict the supply of armaments in case the
guns ended up in the hands of the tribes on the Indian side of the frontier.
As for Amir ’Aman Allah Khan himself, Curzon regarded the new Amir as
an ‘irresponsible’ and ‘hot-headed young man’ and believed the anti-British
Tarzi was the real power behind the throne. 8
Chelmsford did his best to leave the door ajar for negotiations and in
his reply to the Amir’s letter he sidestepped the vexed issue of independ-
ence. London’s refusal to negotiate on this issue, however, encouraged
the Amir to pursue his jihad. The threat of war with Afghanistan posed
serious problems, for India was ill prepared for an invasion. All but eight
battalions of regular troops had been withdrawn and sent to the Western
Front or the Middle East, while stocks of rifles, artillery, ammunition,
rolling stock and other military equipment were at an all-time low. Most
of the battalions still in India were under strength and Pushtun levies,
many recruited from Afghanistan, had replaced front-line troops on the
Northwest Frontier. Furthermore, following the November Armistice,
many officers had returned to Britain on long-overdue home leave. 9
To add to the Viceroy’s woes in the spring of 1919 there was serious
civil unrest in the Punjab and along the Afghan Frontier, precipitated by
the passing of the Rowlatt Act, which extended the draconian measures
of the Defence of India Act of 1915. The severe restriction on civil liber-
ties imposed under these Acts led to boycotts, strikes and mass protests.
In response the Indian government had interned many of the leaders of
the independence movement. The protests culminated in what became