afghanistanas promoted by the Pushtu Academy and the Musahiban dynasty from the
1930s. The pdpa, on the other hand, represented a younger, newly educated
generation whose membership consisted mainly of marginalized popula-
tions – Ghilzais, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Badakhshanis – all of whom
blamed the Muhammadzai dynasty and, in some cases, Pushtuns in general
for their disenfranchisement. As for Da’ud’s obsession with Pushtunistan,
most pdpa members, whether Parchamis or Khalqis, had little interest in
the issue, other than as a way to annoy Pakistan and undermine its alli-
ance with the usa. President Da’ud’s Republican government was always
a nika mut‘a, or temporary marriage of convenience, and one that would
end in a bloody divorce.
The fault lines in Da’ud’s government emerged almost as soon as the
shooting ceased. It took three weeks of horse-trading before President
Da’ud and the pdpa could agree on a Cabinet, during which period govern-
ment virtually ceased. In the end, more than half of the new ministers were
pdpa party members or had strong links to Leftist movements, 4 though
the leaders of the pdpa were notable by their absence from the Cabinet
in an attempt to conceal the degree of Communist influence in the new
government. Instead, these individuals sat on the Central Committee, the
membership of which was never publicized, but Babrak Karmal, Anahita
Ratebzad and Mir Akbar Khyber, the principal leaders of Parcham, were
all prominent members of this committee. When Ambassador Neumann
asked President Da’ud for clarification on the role of this body, Da’ud
informed him that it was ‘not r[e]p[ea]t not the government’ but ‘a group
of “friends” who function as a control committee’. 5 No one in the Western
diplomatic corps believed him and it was an open secret that the Central
Committee was the real decision-making body.
One of the immediate problems President Da’ud had to address was
the fate of the deposed king, Zahir Shah. In this respect, Da’ud had the
upper hand, since the king’s family as well as Shah Wali Khan and his
son, General ‘Abd al-Wali Khan, were under house arrest in Kabul. Da’ud
offered the king a deal. In exchange for allowing his family to leave for Italy
and for the king to continue to receive the revenues from his substantial
estates, Zahir Shah would abdicate and undertake not to attempt to over-
throw the new government. Zahir Shah tamely agreed and the day before
Independence Day the king wrote a brief letter of abdication. A few days
later, his family left for Italy, but Shah Wali Khan and ‘Abd al-Wali Khan
remained in Kabul to ensure the ex-king upheld his side of the bargain.
A month or so after the coup, President Da’ud marked Independence
Day with a rambling speech in which he blamed all the country’s ills on