afghanistanunfavourable impression on most observers, both foreign and inter national
... and one is hard pressed to find anyone to defend it.’ As for Da’ud’s
cabinet, it was ‘inferior’ and ‘incompetent’ and there was ‘near paralysis
and delays in economic decision-making’. 8
President Da’ud and u.s.-Afghan relationsDespite the government being dominated by Parchamis, Da’ud and
Na‘im tried to convince Western governments that Afghanistan was
still Non-Aligned and hoped that the usa and Western nations would
quickly recognize the new regime and provide financial assistance. In
both respects they were disappointed. The ussr and India accorded the
new government diplomatic recognition almost immediately, but the
United States and nato countries delayed until they were sure that Da’ud
was, as Neumann put it, ‘master in his own house’. Na‘im’s argument that
American financial support would strengthen Da’ud’s hand and allow
him to counteract the power of the pdpa found little sympathy with State
Department officials who were not prepared for the usa to prop up the
Republican government, let alone be played off against the ussr. 9 D a’u d ’s
plea for American support was not helped when his Deputy Foreign
Minister publicly declared that King Reza Shah of Iran, America’s most
important ally in the region, was a ‘madman who will soon share the fate
of Zahire [sic] Shah, if not worse’. 10 Reza Shah’s response was to tell the
u.s. ambassador in Tehran that Afghanistan was ‘nothing but trouble’ and
claimed the country was turning into a ‘police state under communist
c o n t r o l .’ 11 In the end, America and the nato countries recognized the
Republican government, but relations with Da’ud and his ministers were
strained, though publicly cordial.
Another source of tension in Afghan-American relations was President
Da’ud’s resurrection of the Pushtunistan issue. Da’ud’s promotion of
Pushtunistan during his time as prime minister had brought Afghanistan
to the brink of war and economic catastrophe, yet he seems to have
learnt nothing from this experience. Shortly after seizing power the state-
controlled media began a belligerent propaganda war against Pakistan
and in favour of Pushtunistan. Pakistan retaliated by reimposing restric-
tions on cross-border traffic and ordered a military build-up in Quetta.
When Ambassador Neumann attempted to moderate the war of words and
persuade President Da’ud to negotiate with Pakistan, Da’ud insisted as a
precondition that Pakistan agree in principle to discuss self -determination
for Pushtunistan, something that Pakistan had consistently refused to