‘between the dragon and his wrath’, 1994–2017Musharraf ’s support for Operation Enduring Freedom reaped immediate
rewards. Sanctions were lifted, Pakistan’s Army and Air Force were rearmed
with modern American weaponry, 3 billion dollars of the nation’s foreign
debt were written off and calls for a restoration of democracy waived.
Economically, the country benefited from American support for an
International Monetary Fund loan. Pakistan also became the main supply
route for u.s. and isaf forces in Afghanistan and saw increased demand for
Pakistani goods as shopkeepers and merchants in Afghanistan restocked.
At the same time, President Musharraf was well aware that power-
ful factions opposed both his military regime and Pakistan’s support
for America’s War on Terror. Many prominent Islamic leaders publicly
declared their sympathy for al-Qa‘ida’s attacks on u.s. soil and up until
9/11 bin Laden T-shirts were openly on sale in the Peshawar and Quetta
bazaars. Musharraf was therefore careful when publicly condemning the
9/11 attacks and, while he sent the army into the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas to suppress al-Qa‘ida and its foreign affiliates, the isi con tinued
to provide covert support for the Afghan Taliban, since the movement
was deemed not to pose a threat to Pakistan’s security. According to the
Taliban themselves, the isi not only gave them a safe haven in Quetta, but
rearmed and trained them too, even though they were killing American
and nato soldiers.
The isi undermined Operation Enduring Freedom in other ways too.
When ‘Abd al-Haq Arsala, the man the cia favoured as the head of state
in a post-Taliban administration, returned to Afghanistan shortly after the
military campaign began, isi officers tipped off the Taliban, who ambushed
his convoy and killed ‘Abd al-Haq and most of his entourage. The isi also
provided tacit protection for the most senior al-Qa‘ida leaders, includ-
ing ’Osama bin Laden. When American Special Forces finally tracked
bin Laden down after nearly a decade of searching, he was living in a
military safe house in Abbottabad, less than a mile from Pakistan’s main
Military Academy. Needless to say the government and military denied
any knowledge of his presence.
Pakistan’s Janus policy, however, eventually backfired as the very
jihadists the isi had trained for operations in Indian-held Kashmir in the
1980s condemned Musharraf ’s support for the u.s. military campaign, and
mounted a series of terrorist attacks on government and officials inside
Pakistan. In 2002 an anti-Musharraf Islamist coalition, led by Sami al-Haq,
gained a majority in the Northwest Frontier Assembly and in the same year
the Tehrik-e-Taliban, or Pakistan Taliban, formed with the stated inten-
tion of deposing President Musharraf and setting up an Islamic state. The