SDSDSVDSVStimeyouread anyliteratureon
Christianity wheresuchquestions
were asked? Probablynever.
This type of question is
not at the centreofinquiry
into anyother belief system,
andyetitisprevalent to the
point of ubiquitous in studies
of conspiracytheory. Why? Is
conspiracytheoryaspecial case
in the field of human belief? And
if it is, what is itabout conspiracy
theorythat justifies this status?
Isuspect thereare anumber
of reasonsforthisrather odd
attitude, some of them connected
to those early essaysand books on
the topic, and some to do with the
momentum of certain scientific
(and quasi-scientific) ideas. And
let’snot forget good old-fashioned
prejudice; who hasn’tentertained
the thought of the conspiracy
theorist asanut job, squirrelling
around the Internet lookingfor
all the othernutjobstoshare
crazy ideas with?
In his seminal essayonthe
subject, Hofstadterwasatpains
to point out that, although he
chose the term ‘paranoid’ to
characterise conspiracism, hewas
not using it inaclinical sense,
but “borrowingaclinical termfor
other purposes”. Nonetheless, the
feeling that therewas something
alittle unhealthyaboutthe
paranoid stylewasclearly
present in Hofstadter’swriting,
and in most of the writing and
research on conspiracytheory
thatfollowedhim.If Hofstadter
thought conspiracytheorywas a
special case of belief,however,
he meant it onlyinthe sense that
he sawitasaquintessentially
American school of oddness,
aquality stemming from the
historicalfact that the United
States had, itself,beenfounded
on what couldreasonably be
termedaconspiracytheory.
Subsequent theorising on
conspiracytheoryhas been less
forgiving, and has tended to the
belief thatwearedealingwith
akind of pathology,political
if not personal.Thereare
dissentingvoices, of course; Rob
Brotherton’sSuspicious Minds^4 is
acaseinpoint,as is the writing
of MatthewDentith.^5 Butevenin
thesemoreeven-handed books,
thereisasense that belief in
conspiracytheoryistheresult of
adisposition, on some or all of our
parts, to believe unlikelythings.
In the current century, this
vaguefeelingabouthuman
disposition has burgeoned into
an academic industry.^6 The
psychology of conspiracytheory
sees largenumbersofbooks and
paperspublishedeveryyear,and
prettymuch everyone of those
papersfocuses on the innate
disposition, or the personality
type, involved.This leads us in
some curious directions; let’s
consideraschool of thought
thatIwill term the ‘gateway
drug’ approachtoconspiracy
theory.^7 In this view, aperson
who believesone conspiracyis
morelikelytobelieve others, and
perhapseventuallyall of them.
Again, on theface of it, this seems
reasonable,butlet’sthinkabout it
slightlydifferently.
Yo uare arational, curious
person,andsomeone introduces
youtothe idea that the
assassination of JFKwas
not thework of alone,nutty
super-marksman, but actuallya
conspiracyinvolvinganumber
of interested parties.Yo ubrowse
the topic online, and thenread a
couple of books, andyoufind the
idea plausible,even convincing.
That same someone suggestsyou
might look at the assassinations
of RobertKennedyand the
Reverend Martin Luther King
(and theydon’task foryour soulbyreturnof post soyouassume
theyare trustworthy). Areyou
morelikelyto: think “OK, I’ll look
into it”,or throwyour hands up
and say, “That’spreposterous! I’m
not going toeven thinkabout it”?
I’dsuggest that the second
response israther lessrational
than the first. Ifaplausible case is
presented toyou, whywouldyou
not look into similarmysteries
presented inasimilar way? That
is to say, if conspiracyseems a
reasonable mode of thought,or
areasonableworldviewtohold,
then it does sobyitsownmerits,
and not because of some innate
disposition onyour part. And
hereisthenubofthe problem in
the psychologised approach:by
concentrating on the personality
of the adherent, itremoves
agencyfromconspiracytheory
as amode of thought and shifts it
onto therecipient ofthat modeof
thought. Inrespectofconspiracy
theoryasasystem,itputs the cart
firmlybeforethe horse, infact.
Conspiracytheories appeal to a
lot of people preciselybecause
theyare well-researched,well-
argued and offeraplausible case;
also because they areamusing or
kooky, but that doesn’tundermine
the point.Theydon’tappeal to us
merelybecausewe’reaparticular
type of person, or becausewe
suffer fromaspecific pathology
of personality or belief.Consider
whatIsaidearlierabout studies
of other beliefs and beliefsystems; if agencywas removed
from the object of belief in those
other cases, whatwouldhappen
to them as objects of study? Ifwe
shiftedfocus from Christianity
to Christians, and suggested
Christian beliefwasaformof
psychological diagnosis,we
wouldradicallyalter the field of
religiousstudies,and notforthe
better.
Thereare plenty of other
arguments against the diagnostic
approachtoconspiracytheory,
notleastthe sheernumber of
people who believe in at least
one conspiracytheory: after all, if
everyone isaconspiracytheorist,
then effectively no one is; or,to
putitanotherway, adiagnosis
that capturesamajority of the
population maynot be telling us
verymuch.Ithink it’stimewe
began to studytheepistemology
andstructureofconspiracytheory
properly,asabonafidesystem of
thought and belief,rather than
trawling the statsfortheelusive
glintof tinfoil.NOTES
1 TheParanoidStyleinAmerican
Politics,byRichardHofstadter,
Harper’s Magazine,November1964.
2 The OpenSociety and itsEnemies,
byKarl Popper,Routledge,London
1945.
3 ALot of People are Saying: theNew
conspiracism and the Assault on
Democracy,NancyLRosenblumand
Russell Muirhead,Princeton University
Press,2019.
4 Suspicious Minds: Whywe
BelieveConspiracy Theories,by
RobBrotherton, Bloomsbury Press,
November 2015.
5 The Philosophy of Conspiracy
theories,byMatthewRXDentith,
PalgraveMacmillanUK, 2014. See
also his article“I’mnot aconspiracy
theorist, but...”,FT324:36-39.
6 Foracomprehensivereview of
current researchonconspiracy
theory,see:ASystematicReview
and Meta-Analysis ofPsychological
ResearchonConspiracyBeliefs:
FieldCharacteristics, Measurement
Instruments,andAssociations with
PersonalityTraits, inFrontiers in
Psychology,11February 2019.
7 See,for instance,Belief in
Conspiracy Theories,byTedGoertzel,
inPoliticalPsychology,Vol 15 No 4,
December 1994, pp 731-742.2 NOEL ROONEYis apoet and
longstanding fortean. He writes
FT’sregular‘Conspirasphere’
column.FT389 55ABOVE:In his seminal book, RichardHofstadter was not using the word‘paranoid’
in its clinical sense,and yet academic approaches to conspiracy theory have
tended to assume that some sortofpathology is at work.