ofThrace.³¹⁷CaptainTahsinbecamethefirstcommanderofthiscombinedcav-
alry-tankunitaccordingtotheFrenchschoolofthought,therebytakingapio-
neerroleintheTurkisharmedforces.
Withregardtothesourcesforthetacticaldevelopment,theTurkishmilitary
pressdidnotseeaconflictbetweenGermanandFrenchschoolintheconductof
war.Carryingoutoperationswasamatterofplanning,notofchosingtheright
system.³¹⁸Consequently,theTurkisharmymanagedtobuildanarmoredbranch
bytheuseofRussiantanks,FrenchorganizationandamixtureofGermanand
othersourcesforitsfieldregulations.TherebytheTurkisharmyavoidedimitat-
ingthedisadvantagesofonerolemodel,sinceduringthe 19 30s,tanktacticsand
strategieswerenotyetcombatprovenconcepts.³¹⁹Evenpro-Germanminded
TurkishofficerspreferredamixtureforthecreationofaTurkishwayoftankwar-
fare.³²⁰
GermaninstructorsalsotriedtohaveasayintheevolvementoftheTurkish
tankdebate.TheretiredBavarianColonel,HugoHöfl,aninstructorintheinfan-
tryschool,gaveanintroductiontomoderntankwarfareinhiscourses.Hisles-
sonsincludedtankdefencemeasuresbyinfantryunits.Thiswasatypicalfeature
oftherathertheoreticalapproachintheReichswehrduringthoseyears.³²¹Max-
imilianBraungaveanoverviewofthecombinedarmswarfare,the‘favorite
child’oftheWehrmachtinthemid- 19 30s.Heconcentratedonthecooperation
oftheinfantryandtanks,abstainingfromreferencestoGermanprinciples.³²²
RonaldL.Tarnstrom,BalkanBattles(Lindsborg:TrogenBooks1998), 115.
Cf.theseriesbySadık,“FransızveAlmanMuharebeUsulleriArasındaFarkVarMı?”[Is
thereaDifferencebetweenFrenchandGermanWarfareCustoms?],AM 50 – 87 (19 32 ), 497 –
51 4;parttwo:Sadık,“MevzilereTaarruz”[AttackonthePositions],AM 50 – 90 (19 33 ), 292 –
29 5;partthree:Sadık,“MüdafaaBahsi”[TheTopicofDefense],AM 54 – 81 (19 33 ), 624 – 62 9.
SeealsotheEren,“AlmanOrdusundaNelerGördüm(2)”;Çifci,ŞarkCephesi’ndenKore’ye,1 07.
FortheproblemsoftheFrenchstrategyseeHenryDutailly,“Programmesd’Armamentet
StructuresModernesdansl’ArméedeTerre, 1935 – 1939 ,”BeiheftederFrancia 10 (1981), 105 –
12 8.FortheSpanishCivilWarasatestinggroundforSovietandGermanstrategies(atthis
timetopsecretandthereforewithoutsignificancefortheTurkishdebate),JohnDaley,“Soviet
andGermanAdvisorsPutDoctrineToTheTest:TanksInTheSiegeOfMadrid,”Armor 63 – 3
(1999), 33 – 37.
SeetheessaybyGeneralMittelberger’sinterpreterSalihErkuş,“İstikbalHarplerindeZırhlı
veMotorlüVasıtalarınKullanmaTarsi”[ApplicationofAmoredandMotorizedForcesinFuture
Wars],AM 56 – 11 (1938), 931 – 948.
Höfl,“ModernTanklar”[ModernTanks],PM 7 – 74 (1932), 28 – 39 .FortheGermandebatesee
MarkusPöhlmann,DerPanzerunddieMechanisierungdesKriegesEinedeutscheGeschichte 1890
bis 1945 (Paderborn:FerdinandSchöningh, 20 16), 182 – 20 6.
Braun,“TanklarınDiğerSilahlarlaBirlikteCalışması”[CollaborationbetweenTanksand
otherArmsBranches],trans.CelâleddinGermiyanoğlu,AM 54 – 101 (1936), 314 – 32 6.
232 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter1 918