Intheevaluationofsingularcombatsituations,bothsidesshowedgreatin-
terest.Thewartimetransferofmilitaryknowledgebecamevisibleintheevalua-
tionsofbothcountries.InGermany,themisreadingofdefensivemeasuresinthe
battleofÇanakkalecontributedtomilitaryfailurein1 944 .InTurkey,mainlyGer-
many,togetherwithFranceservedasasourceofreflection.Moreover,duringthe
1920 s,aTurkishmilitaryschoolofthoughtemerged,whichdrewitslessonsfrom
nationalcampaignsofthepast.Germanmilitaryknowledgewasonlyoneamong
manysources,whichwasincorporatedintoTurkishmilitarythinking.
TheTurkishGeneralStaffavoidedthemistakesofthepastbyhiringretired
Germanmilitaryinstructors.TheGermanstaffconsistedofmenofanadvanced
agewithpracticalexperience.Theyworkedascivilianadvisorsandhadnosay
inTurkishmilitarymatters.Theirmilitaryconsultancyprovedtobeofgreatvalue
forbothgovernments,especiallyintheGermancaseafter 1939 .Nonetheless,
duringtheSecondWorldWar,theformerlyinfluentialGerman-mindedTurkish
officersbecameamarginalizedandrandomgroup.
Conclusion 239