academy.Backintroducedafasttracktrainingprogrammeforseniorcandidates
inordertocompensatethelossesoftheBalkanWars.Theywerepostedtounits
assecondlieutenantsimmediatelyaftergraduation.Backalsoorderedtosend
thecadetsfromthelastgradesinmilitaryhighschoolstothemilitaryacademy.
Thisemergencyprogramalsoincludedspecialfasttrackclassesforjuniorinfan-
tryandcavalryofficersfortheartilleryandengineerbranches.Thearmywas
therebyprovidedwithasufficientnumberofofficerstostayfunctionalduring
thefirstcampaignsafterarenewedmobilization.Thisalsohadasconsequence
thatmanyyoungofficersweregivenresponsiblepositions.¹⁹⁸Back’sdecision
hadconsequencesfortheGerman-Ottomanalliance.DuringtheFirstWorld
War,mostoftheOttomanofficersweremuchyoungerthanthesame-ranking
Germanofficers,oftenresultinginperpetualenvyandmalevolenceamongthe
twoallies.Withthemountingdangerofwar,themilitaryacademyfinallyclosed
on 30 July 191 4withthegraduationofthelastfasttrackclassofseniorofficers,
followedbythehastygraduationofthelastclassofthefirstyearjuniorofficers.
Duringthewar,numerousspecialofficer-trainingfacilitiesallovertheempire
fulfilledthetaskoftheacademy,whichwasnottoreopenuntil1April 1923 .¹⁹⁹
Severalmilitaryreformsweretohaveasocialimpactinthefollowingdeca-
des.Inadditiontotheintensifiedstaffofficer-trainingprogramme,theofficer
trainingcampssetupacrosstheempirewerereopenedaftertheinterruption
bythe1912/ 1913 war.Theywerecomplementedbycorporaltrainingcampsin
ordertostrengthentheOttomanNCOcorpsandtorelievetheOttomanofficers
fromdailyroutinetasks.²⁰⁰Theinstructioninthesetrainingcampswentfarbe-
yondapurelymilitarypurpose.Militaryservicehadacleardisciplinarypurpose
fortherankandfilesinGermany.²⁰¹In 1910 ananonymousGermanauthorar-
guedthattheOttomanofficerandespeciallythelongerservingNCOsshould
beusedinthecivilianadministrationaftertheirserviceinthearmy:
“[T]heyknowhowtoactattherighttimeandintherightmanner,withoutbeinginfluenced
byharmfulandbureaucratictraditions.Whatismostimportantfortherecoveryofthe[Ot-
toman]administrationisaction,energeticandsystematicaction.[...]ForTurkey,thecultur-
almeaningofmilitarismcannotbevaluedhighenough.[...][Militarism]isjuvenescentand
renovatinganditleadsthestatebacktotheprinciplethatoncehadmadeit[theOttoman
state]great.”²⁰²
Anonymous,HarpOkuluTarihçesi,38.
Anonymous,HarpOkuluTarihçesi,38,48.
H.R.,“DasheutigeMilitärbildungswesenderTürkei,”MWB 138 (1913),cols.1 337 – 13 38.
Schacht,“DieMitgiftdesReservisten,”MWB 49 (1911), 112 3.
OsmanischerLloyd,25September 1910.
72 2ThePeakofKnowledgeTransfer