whatwehadexperiencedandlearnedinthisregardandgavetheorder‘tobuildthoseun-
dergroundsheltersinnecessarynumberstoprotectthesoldiersfromartilleryfire.’”²⁵⁹Thankstothoseshelters,whichinsomecasesmeasuredbetween 15 to 20 meters
underthesurface,theOttomanforcescouldsurvivelong-lastingRussianbom-
bardmentandreducetheirlosses.²⁶⁰TheOttomanarmyalsouseddeployment
tothistheaterofwar toenhancetheirownartilleryfiringtechniques.The
poorstateoftheOttomanartilleryaftertheBalkanWarsimprovedslowly.In
theopinionofOttoPosseldt,instructorwiththeOttomanfieldartillerysince
1909 ,theOttomanordnanceoperatingcrewshadfoughtwell.ForPosseldt,
shortageofammunitionhadpreventedtheOttomanartilleryforcesfromdefend-
ingKırkKilise.²⁶¹Withoutknowing,Posseldtmentionedageneralmilitarydevel-
opmentthatwastobecomethemostsevereofproblemsfortheartillerybranch-
esofEuropeanarmiesinautumn 191 4,namely,amiscalculationofammunition
stocksforalongcampaignintheageofmassiveartillerybattles.²⁶²ForPosseldt,
thePrussianMajorTupschoewskihadbeenthedrivingforcebehindtheim-
provementoftheOttomanfieldartillery.In1911,throughtheformationofthe
artillerymodel regiment,acertainstandardhadbeen maintained, mainly
thankstodailydrillswiththeKruppordnance.Besidesthelowsupplystocks,
Posseldtblamedtheineptitudeofmanyhighercommandersinthetacticaluse
ofartilleryunitsforthepoorperformanceduringtheBalkancampaigns.The
qualityoftheOttomanammunition(ofGermanorigin)andabidingbytheGer-
manfieldmanualshadcontributedtotheOttomandefensivesupports.Thelatter
finallyfoundtheirexpressioninsuccessfuldefenseoftheÇatalçaline,where
Tupschoewski’smodelregimentfoughtscatteredacrossOttomanlines.²⁶³How-
ever,oneshouldnotethattheGermanartilleryfieldregulationwasnotfree
fromwrongassumptions.Withthebeginningofthewar,ofalltheimpractical
prewarevaluationsintheGermanmilitarypresssolelythe‘hidden’firingposi-
tionprovedtobefeasible.²⁶⁴TheGerman-Ottomanmilitarycooperationinthe
Yazman,KumandanımGaliçyaNeYanaDüşer,1 46 – 147.
AswasthecaseduringtheRussianKerenskyoffensiveinJune/July1 91 7;Yazman,Kuman-
danımGaliçyaNeYanaDüşer,2 21.
P.[osseldt],“DietürkischeFeldartillerie,”MWB 155 (1913), 350 7.Thesourceofhisarticle
wasananonymousOttomanartilleryofficer.
HansLinnenkohl,VomEinzelschusszurFeuerwalze:DerWettlaufzwischenTechnikundTak-
tikimErstenWeltkrieg(Koblenz:Bernhard&Graefe,1996), 157.
P.[osseldt],“DietürkischeFeldartillerie,”cols.3 507 – 350 8.
Cf.Linnenkohl,VomEinzelschusszurFeuerwalze,1 45 – 14 9.Seealsotherespectivepara-
graphsinthereportsoftheGermanofficersfromtheBalkanWar,forexampleRohde,Unsere
GefechtsvorschriftenundderBalkankrieg,5 1 – 90.
84 2ThePeakofKnowledgeTransfer