basis for its armies, the concomitant distribution of martial skills among
the populace it had required, and the rise of a professional class of soldiers.
As powerful as the Tang dynasty was militarily in its early years, the
development of professional soldiers in the early eighth century and the
return to prominence of steppe generals within the Tang army in the later
part of the seventh century led to increasing tensions between the army
and the imperial court. These tensionsnearly shattered the Tang dynasty
during the An Lushan Rebellion ( 755 – 63 ). Even after the rebellion was
suppressed, the relative peace of theearly Tang dynasty could not be fully
restored. Power once again devolved onto regional strongmen, who bal-
anced regional military and political power against the local forces beneath
them and the central authorities of the imperial court above them. Military
force was the direct measure of political influence. An ambitious young
man skilled in the martial arts and capable of leading men in battle could
rise to great heights of power from humble beginnings. The prospects for
an educated man without aristocratic pedigree were far more limited,
though considerably less risky. Tang imperial power essentially collapsed
with the Huang Chao Rebellion ( 875 – 84 ). Generals, warlords, and local
strongmen of all stripes arose in this environment tofight for power.
Ultimately, the Tang dynasty degenerated into the same environment of
armed chaos from which it had emerged.
The Tang Military
Most of the early Tang army was composed of infantrymen, drafted into
service under thefubingsystem.Fubingunits served in the capital, typically
for a one-month tour, chosen on a rotating basis calculated by distance
from the capital. A given unit might serve two tours in the capital each year.
While afubingunit could be sent to the frontier for up to three years, some
units went decades without a frontier deployment. This system, like the
one inherited by the Qin and Han, owed its development to the preceding
centuries of warfare rather than being a distinctly Tang innovation. As we
saw in theprevious chapter, its emergence in the late sixth century was tied
to the need to supplement the limited number of North Eurasian cavalry of
the Western Wei, soon to become the Northern Zhou, regime in its struggle
against the Eastern Wei. The shift away from armies composed exclusively
of steppe cavalry, whether Xianbei, Gaoju Türk, or some other group, to
armies of Chinese infantrymen was a sea change in martial enfranchisement.
Soldiers in thefubingsystem farmed when not called up for duty and main-
tained their martial arts skills year-round. Afubingsoldier was supposed to
The Tang Military 97