The second structural problem of the Ming military was its system of
recruitment and training. Troops were recruited from designated military
households, which were required to send one soldier to a designated unit,
and one supernumerary soldier to assist him. Alongside the hereditary
military families was a military exam system designed to supply soldiers
and officers for the army. Unlike the Song Dynasty examination system, the
Ming military exams produced some outstanding graduates, like Qi Jiguang
and Yu Dayou. While the exam system had some value, it did not impose a
baseline of quality for the entire officer corps. Training for the ordinary
soldiers was supposed to be taken in rotation by all units in northern China
at the capital, Beijing, to ensure high standards. As the registers of military
households became increasingly outdated and inaccurate, however, and the
regular training rotation of troops also declined, overall numbers and
quality of the military collapsed. A smaller core of effective troops remained
within the emptied rosters of established formations.
Local security, while theoretically within the purview of the regular army,
was functionally and more usually the responsibility of local militias. Some
of these militias were government-organized police forces, and others were
created by local elites. In either case, they drew upon the same pool of violent
local men from which sprang bandits and rebels. Martial arts was a com-
mon currency within this group, whether it was employed for or against the
state, or simply used to prey upon or protect local people. These men of
violence were everywhere, with many congregating at temples or markets.
Militias were better suited to the low-level warfare of banditry or pirate
attacks than the cumbersome and poorly maintained regular military. Just
as happened during the Song Dynasty, when the imperial army failed, the
government was forced to use various militia forces.
Regular training and the military exams stressed archery, with officers
also being tested in riding and in shooting from horseback. Even though
guns, both handguns and cannon, were extremely important to the Ming
military, archery with bow and crossbow was still a central skill. And, as
was true through so much of Chinese history, steppe cavalry were recruited
into the Ming military. This was a pragmatic decision that brought large
numbers of Mongols into north China and registered them as military
households, to bolster the army and weaken the Mongols in the steppe.
Horse-archers remained the most important striking force in north China,
while infantry and naval forces were the dominant forces in south China.
There was thus a wide divergence in military and martial practice in
China’s different regions. The Ming military was really a collection of
separate forces: northern, southern, and naval.
The Ming Military 167