98 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
them despite the prickliness on both sides. Of growing importance
to the Politburo was what was euphemistically known as ‘military-
technical collaboration’ with fourteen non-communist countries.
These included India, Syria, Afghanistan, North Yemen, South Yemen,
Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Guinea
and Guinea-Bissau. Nicaragua had recently expanded the list to fif-
teen. Moscow sent arms and advisers to each of them. The Politburo’s
priority was the quest for global status and influence. Aid went forth
without budgetary rigour. Over the years the Soviet leadership
received only seventy per cent of the cost of its supplies. Several coun-
tries were entirely let off what they owed – or were asked for less than
the total amount, usually in the form of locally produced goods. The
Soviet government indulged Afghanistan, Angola and Ethiopia,
Mozambique and Nicaragua in this way.^27 Behind the scenes, Soviet
leaders referred to such countries as ‘clients’.^28
Though the military lobby had huge influence on Soviet politics, it
was not completely united. In 1982 Defence Minister Ustinov sup-
ported Castro’s assistance to Angola’s President José Eduardo dos
Santos in the struggle against South Africa. The General Staff disliked
yet another extension of the USSR’s military commitments around the
world; its leaders were averse to the endless extension of the USSR’s
commitments that had taken place in the 1970s; and they avowed that
the Angolans, whose training had been supervised by Soviet person-
nel, should be capable of conducting their own campaign. Varennikov,
who assumed command of the USSR’s forces in Afghanistan after
Sergei Sokolov became Defence Minister, defended this position with
some robustness. Dos Santos had success only when he appealed
directly to the Politburo. Ustinov had trouble with Chief of Staff Oga-
rkov and Varennikov at the General Staff, who wanted no increase in
the Soviet military commitment to southern Africa.^29 But it was Usti-
nov who was the Politburo member and had the authority and
temperament to impose himself. He had served in the Brezhnev team
that masterminded the policy of extending the USSR’s global influence
by providing military advice and financial credits. He could make or
break a military commander’s career, and Ogarkov was taking a risk in
challenging Ustinov’s favoured orientation.
Meanwhile the American plan to install Pershing-2 missiles in
Western Europe agitated everyone in the Kremlin and induced efforts
to seek help in preventing this from happening. The communist
parties – even the troublesome Italians – could be relied on to do their