MIKHAIL GORBACHËV 123intermediate-range missiles – American, British and French – in the
discussion; they also registered objection to America’s foreign bases
for its nuclear forces as well as to the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The Americans refused to give way and insisted that all categories
of bombs, missiles and vehicles should be taken separately and in
sequence.
Chernenko’s funeral on 13 March 1985 gave an opportunity for
foreign leaders to make the acquaintance of the new General Secre-
tary. There was a rolling maul to get a seat in the front row at the
committal – President François Mitterrand elbowed his way to a place
between Margaret Thatcher and Morocco’s Prime Minister Moham-
med Lamrani.^28 Afterwards Gorbachëv, accompanied by Gromyko,
talked with Babrak Karmal who was Afghanistan’s General Secretary
and chairman of its Revolutionary Council Presidium. While promis-
ing the USSR’s continued support, he pointed out that the Soviet Army
could not stay in Afghanistan for ever and urged Karmal to broaden
the social basis of his support. Karmal could see that Soviet policy was
undergoing deep change; he warned Gorbachëv that without assis-
tance from Moscow, his government would fall.^29 Next day Gorbachëv
talked with President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. When Zia complained
about the burden of sheltering three million Afghan refugees, Gor-
bachëv replied that Afghan rebel forces trained for their military
operations in Pakistani bases – he later told the Politburo that he had
taught Zia a lesson about regional politics.^30 Czechoslovakia’s Husák
was easier to handle. He told Gorbachëv that the Warsaw Pact should
extend its existence for a further two decades beyond its current
term.^31 Out of the scores of communist parties from the rest of the
world which sent delegations to the funeral, Gorbachëv agreed to
receive only one of them – the Italians: this was an early signal of his
sympathy with their Eurocommunist commitment to democracy.^32
Gorbachëv made a deep impression on Bush and Shultz, and they
reported to Reagan that he was healthy and ebullient and could speak
off the cuff without difficulty.^33 He did not return the compliment in
his account to Party Central Committee secretaries. The Americans,
he commented, had not brought ‘a very serious team’ with them – he
said that Bush looked ‘lost’ when they touched on topics off the usual
agenda. He had hoped for Reagan to make the trip instead of sending
a letter of vague content.^34
The West Europeans expressed hopefulness about the Geneva
talks. Mitterrand expressed disapproval of the extension of the arms