THE MOSCOW REFORM TEAM 129September 1985; and Chebrikov remained as KGB Chairman. All had
helped him to gain selection as General Secretary, and this was among
the reasons why he promoted them: he had to repay his political debt.
He would soon discover that none of them shared the intensity of his
commitment to radical change.
Though Ligachëv approved of reform, he hoped to hold it within
limits not far beyond what Andropov might have imposed. As a
former Siberian party secretary, he had the reputation for personal
rectitude and indefatigability; and such was his self-confidence that he
had once rejected Brezhnev’s proposal to redeploy him as Soviet
Ambassador to ‘a prestigious European country’.^1 It would not be long
before Ligachëv was trying to obstruct political innovation. Ryzhkov
had similar misgivings about reforming the economy. As an ex-
engineer of the Uralmash industrial complex, he believed in state owner-
ship and central planning even though he had thought Andropov too
timid about retail price reform.^2 Viktor Chebrikov had been a party
secretary until his transfer to the KGB, where he became Andropov’s
deputy and his successor. He had the reputation of a professional
policeman; he thought that leadership had ‘rehabilitated’ too many
people whom Stalin had punished in the 1930s and 1940s.^3 Whereas
he was willing to consider some new ways of thinking about security,
his outlook was steeped in his agency’s traditions. Gorbachëv would
be frustrated by such individuals; but he was also to feel protected by
their presence against criticisms from unconditional communist con-
servatives that he was driving fast into a dangerous unknown.
In international politics, however, Gorbachëv took his foot off the
brake within weeks of becoming General Secretary and terminated the
alliance with Gromyko. His first step in this direction was to abolish
the various Politburo commissions that Gromyko headed.^4 The old
man’s days of dominance drew to an end and a rumour spread around
Old Square that Gorbachëv was plotting to move him into a different
job. This really was the General Secretary’s intention. On 29 June 1985
he asked the Politburo to approve Gromyko’s promotion as Chair-
man of the Supreme Soviet. Gromyko put up no resistance. He
appeared to like the status that was about to accrue to him; he prob-
ably also recognized that the demands of his work at the ministry were
now beyond him. Politburo regulars noticed that he often seemed to
run out of energy and although he still talked a lot at meetings, he was
beginning to fumble his words.^5 The idea of becoming head of state
acquired a distinct appeal for him, and Gorbachëv engineered the