AMERICAN REJECTION 173Soviet authorities were also testing a range of cruise missiles and stra-
tegic bombers, as the CIA regularly brought to Reagan’s attention.^26
The Moscow media were inadvertently assisting America’s anti-Soviet
crusaders. On 6 March 1986 Soviet TV aired a programme suggesting
that America had procured the death of former Swedish Prime Minis-
ter Olof Palme. The killings of former Italian ex-Prime Minister Aldo
Moro in 1978 and India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 were
also attributed to American connivance.^27 Such allegations worsened
the atmosphere between America and the USSR; and though Reagan
leaned towards wanting a softening of relations with the Kremlin lead-
ership, he had to keep account of the evidence of military build-up on
the Soviet side. There existed the possibility that Gorbachëv’s overtures
were only a feint in the diplomatic game that he was playing. Reagan
had always said that he would judge Moscow by its actions rather than
its words – and anyway not all of its words were pointed in the direc-
tion of conciliation. As American President he was well aware that any
administration could contain factions in conflict. He needed to feel
sure that the advocates of peace genuinely held the upper hand in the
Politburo.
Against this background, Shultz could not afford to appear too
pliable in talks with Moscow. He told Ambassador Dobrynin and
Prime Minister Ryzhkov that Gorbachëv’s declaration was fundamen-
tally unconstructive.^28 Gorbachëv wanted to finalize a deal exclusively
about nuclear weapons; he had omitted conventional forces from his
proposals. This was never going to be acceptable to Washington.
Soviet leaders also needed to understand that the Americans would
have little confidence in them until they respected human rights in
their country, ceased to bully Eastern Europe and ended support for
insurgency, subversion and terrorism around the world. If Gorbachëv
wanted agreements on arms reduction, he had to alter his stance on
the other matters of importance to the American administration.^29
Shultz continued to prod the President into renewing the talks
with the USSR: ‘Although much of Gorbachëv’s proposal is clearly
designed for propaganda effect, we cannot dismiss out of hand the
possibility that Gorbachëv is making an effort to maintain the dynamic
of improving US–Soviet relations that you and he began at the
summit.’ He listed the signs of progress. Gorbachëv had taken steps
forward in respect of human rights; he also accepted Reagan’s ultimate
goal of complete military denuclearization. The two sides concurred
that the superpowers should start by moving towards having equal