17. THE STALLED INTERACTION
Gorbachëv failed to anticipate the sheer suspicion that his January
declaration would arouse in the West. Foreign trips in the previous
year had provided him with impressions that no amount of advice
from aides and research institutes could match as he tried to sharpen
his foreign policy. Now he rested from his travels for several months.
He assumed that he had made a splendid offer to America and the
world. He expected a speedy constructive response. If he had made
even a brief visit to any of the NATO countries, he would have seen
things more clearly. He was dumbfounded by the coagulated reticence
he witnessed in Western capitals.
In fairness to him, he had other urgent matters on his agenda
sheet. He especially needed to work out how to present the pro-
gramme of action to his party and people. His focus was on his report
to the forthcoming Party Congress. It wearied him to receive the
dreary drafts of his advisory groups. Yakovlev recruited people who
might introduce some liveliness.^1 The Afghan question bothered
everyone. Kovalëv, one of Shevardnadze’s deputies, supplied a passage
that described the war as a ‘bloody wound’ and made the case for a
withdrawal of Soviet forces. Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze liked all
this. When Gorbachëv circulated it to the Politburo, several leaders
objected.^2 He judged it too risky to annoy them and decided to cross
out the commitment to military withdrawal. When Shevardnadze
found out, he was angry about Gorbachëv’s failure to consult him and
phoned to remonstrate. He threatened to raise the question in his own
right at the Congress unless Gorbachëv reverted to their original
understanding. Gorbachëv conceded. Leaving for the Congress on
25 February 1986, he picked up the phone and told Shevardnadze:
‘Your instruction has been fulfilled.’^3
They believed that they had important tasks to accomplish in
tandem. Shevardnadze returned from Japan knowing that there was
no prospect of breaking the CoCom restrictions on technological