206 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
(Perle, for once, chose not to reply.)^49 Regional disputes received atten-
tion; but only one of them, the Iran–Iraq war, brought Shevardnadze
and Shultz together – and even then they could not agree on a joint
declaration. The other regions produced dispute. Shevardnadze’s people
felt annoyance at the American assumption that all would be well in
southern Africa if only Cuba withdrew its forces from Angola. The only
consolation for Shevardnadze was that Shultz made no mention of the
Afghan question.^50 Reagan said nothing about it either; but he did not
fail to accentuate his commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative. A
gleam of light shone when the President assented to Gorbachëv’s idea
about a pre-summit meeting.
There was a tussle over the venue. Shultz suspected that Reagan
would prefer London, where he could liaise with Thatcher. He lobbied
instead for Reykjavik.^51 Gorbachëv agreed to this idea. Reykjavik was
the capital of a neutral country lying roughly equidistant from the
American east coast and central Russia; and its very geographical
isolation would free the leaders from distractions.
Gorbachëv was not naive about his chances. On 26 September
1986 he told Shevardnadze and other leaders that many leading Amer-
icans wished to heighten international tensions and prevent the USSR
from enhancing its dynamism: ‘And so, comrades, nobody’s going to
help us.’^52 He resolved to be bold at Reykjavik and told his planning
group – Chebrikov, Zaikov, Kovalëv, Akhromeev and Chernyaev – to
draft such proposals as Reagan would be unable to reject out of hand.^53
On 3 October 1986, on a short break in Crimea, Gorbachëv talked to
Chernyaev about what else he could do in advance of the encounter.
Chernyaev highlighted the benefits of boldness and simplicity; he
advised Gorbachëv to push Reagan on to the back foot by calling for
rapid big cuts in nuclear stockpiles. Gorbachëv, in his opinion, ought
to endorse Reagan’s ‘zero option’ for intermediate-range nuclear
weapons and propose a fifty per cent reduction in strategic weaponry
in the very first stage of disarmament. Chernyaev said that the Defense
Initiative would cease to be a threat if Gorbachëv could persuade
Reagan to renounce the right to test the research results.^54
On 4 October 1986, speaking to the planning group, Gorbachëv
focused on the links between internal and external policy: ‘Our aim is
to break up the next stage of the arms race. If we don’t do this, the
danger for us will go on growing. But not having conceded on con-
crete questions, even very important ones, we are losing hold on what
is really important. We’re going to be dragged into an unsustainable