208 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
After the Chernobyl catastrophe, this was not the advice that Gor-
bachëv wanted to hear. He aimed to say only that ‘the specialists are
studying the consequences’.^65
The Politburo’s planning group – now consisting of Zaikov,
Chebrikov, Sokolov, Dobrynin, Yakovlev and Kovalëv – supplied the
guidelines he had requested. They stressed that American public
opinion was pressing for a deal with the USSR. The group advised him
to link all aspects of disarmament.^66 Gorbachëv asked Politburo mem-
bers to make any response before their next meeting.^67 When they
reassembled on 8 October 1986, he admitted that a collapse in the
talks was a possibility. But he leaned towards optimism. Reagan, he
reckoned, understood that the advice from the American ‘hawks’
would do him no good in public opinion around the world. Gromyko
commented that the decision to install SS-20s in Europe had been
‘a crude mistake’. This was an impressive recantation by the former
Foreign Affairs Minister. About negotiating tactics, Ligachëv endorsed
Gorbachëv’s proposal to put forward a package that brought together
all the Soviet requirements. But he also recognized that Gorbachëv
needed sanction for some flexibility at Reykjavik if Reagan should
prove awkward; he suggested that the General Secretary should be
permitted to agree to a partial bilateral reduction in nuclear weaponry.
The point was to keep up the momentum for further progress.^68
Shevardnadze continued to predict that the Americans would
insist on unbundling the package as a condition of further progress.
He had spoken to them more recently than Gorbachëv and under-
stood that Reagan had invested his ‘personal prestige’ in the Defense
Initiative.^69 He hoped to persuade Gorbachëv to drop the condition
that the Americans should give up the Strategic Defense Initiative in
return for a deal on nuclear arms reductions.^70 The General Secretary
felt otherwise, aiming to negotiate on the basis of a single comprehen-
sive package. He was counting on his ability to persuade the President
to confine the research and testing of the Defense Initiative to ‘lab-
oratories’. Surely Reagan would want the prize of an immense bilateral
reduction in nuclear weapons? He hoped to pull the President into the
orbit of his project for arms reduction.