210 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Iceland. Reagan took this to heart and called his spokesman Lyn
Nofziger for a one-on-one meeting in the presidential living quarters.
The normal procedure was for others to be present to guard against
departures from the official line. Reagan wanted a frank, confidential
chat with someone who would pull no punches. Nofziger, true to form,
recounted that many Reaganites worried that he might fail to stand up
to Gorbachëv – and that Gorbachëv ‘might have his lunch’. Reagan told
Nofziger that there was no cause for concern. He had learned how to
deal with communists in his time at the Screen Actors Guild; he was
confident that he could handle the General Secretary.^6
Disquiet continued to be expressed by many politicians and sup-
porters who had helped him get elected. The prospect of a summit
encouraged Edward Teller and Congressman Jim Courter to urge him
to increase funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative; and they
explained their fear that the USSR alone would finance and develop
such a programme.^7 The Lithuanian diaspora called on him to demand
that Gorbachëv should renounce Stalin’s annexation of their country
in the 1940s.^8 Reagan paid little mind to the clamour until after an
article by Newsweek’s conservative columnist George Will that ridi-
culed the ‘headlong rush for a summit’. The President decided to invite
him to the White House for a conversation. As they faced each other,
he pointed out that no President of recent years matched his deter-
mination to face down the Soviet leadership. His self-composure
reassured Will, and the fuss in the press died down.^9 Reagan also
sought to allay the doubts of many in Congress. Following the custom
before summits, he gave a personal briefing to a group headed by
Speaker Tip O’Neill and Senator Robert Dole. He hoped to convince
both sides of Congress that the President was firm and open about
his purposes. Reagan stressed that he had always been frank about his
vision of the American national interest. He promised to do nothing
in Iceland that would take people by surprise.^10
Of course, nobody in the American administration could predict
how the Soviet leader would behave. The Kremlin kept its own counsel
in the days before the Reykjavik talks. Gorbachëv played cautiously,
restraining his usual flamboyance. What was he up to? The worry in
Washington was that he liked to spring surprises and might try to do
this in Reykjavik. On a trip to New York in late September 1986, one
of Gorbachëv’s advisers – the academic Georgi Arbatov – told Henry
Kissinger that Shevardnadze would shortly arrive with Gorbachëv’s
new ideas to resolve the Strategic Defense Initiative question. Kissinger