318 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
as irreversible; and Zhivkov kept in mind how Khrushchëv’s reforms
had resulted in national revolt in Hungary. The solution, according
to Gorbachëv, was to turn perestroika into a success and make it
worthwhile to imitate it.^14
Gorbachëv, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev crossed their fingers and
hoped for the best. Shevardnadze valued Jaruzelski’s speeches for their
maturity. He wanted him to rally support from ‘the advanced part’
of society, including ex-members of Solidarity. He considered that
‘the basic difficulties have been overcome’ and he was pleased that
Gorbachëv and Jaruzelski had ‘a complete mutual understanding’.^15
Gorbachëv was no less optimistic. The main thing bothering him
about the Comecon countries was that their standard of living was
higher than that which the Soviet people enjoyed. (Can he really have
meant to include Romania in his analysis?)^16
Gorbachëv should have known better. He had heard from Markus
Wolf, head of the Main Intelligence Administration in East Germany,
that Honecker was obtaining secret loans from West Germany to stave
off economic ruin. Gorbachëv admitted to the Politburo that he had
yet to work out a practical policy to deal with East Germany. Prime
Minister Ryzhkov expressed annoyance at the attitude struck by
Honecker and his entourage. As the result of exporting oil and gas to
the Comecon countries at knock-down prices, the Soviet Union found
itself in debt to them by 14 billion rubles. Yet East Germany’s Prime
Minister Willi Stoph demanded payment strictly on schedule. Ryzh-
kov said that East Germany’s only interest in trade with the USSR was
in pursuit of raw materials; he was dismayed by the way that Honecker
and Stoph were ‘orientated upon China’. Gorbachëv could only suggest
the need for a fresh effort to bind East Germany close again to
Moscow.^17 Wolf told his Soviet contacts that Honecker’s policies had
brought the country to the brink of unavoidable collapse. By autumn
1987 Valentin Falin – the USSR’s former Ambassador to West Ger-
many – was counselling Gorbachëv to drop his idea of declaring that
two Germanies would exist for another fifty or a hundred years. Gor-
bachëv ignored the advice.^18 Falin continued to warn him that East
Germany could suddenly experience destabilization at any time.^19
Hungary was another country that caused Moscow some concern.
In March 1987 the Hungarian communist leadership warned the
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘It would be right for you to con-
sider the question of the further presence of your forces in our country
and generally in Eastern and Central Europe. For events in the future