382 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
stressed that the USSR’s military intervention was really at an end. He
added that the Afghans were conducting their own civil war and there
were no Soviet troops serving in false uniforms.^22 Deng smoked
frantically as he gave his account of China’s recent diplomatic history.
He noted that President Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972 had enabled
America to appreciate the importance of Taiwan to the Chinese
administration. He added that China and Japan had resolved several
matters of dispute in 1978. He emphasized that Hong Kong, whose
lease to the United Kingdom would come to its term in 1997, was high
on his agenda.^23
Deng’s tone sharpened when he discussed the USSR. Distrustful of
the Vietnamese, he said there would be no peace in Cambodia until
they had truly withdrawn to their own country. He picked up the
comment about fake uniforms and accused Vietnam’s forces of exactly
this subterfuge.^24 Shevardnadze offered to do what he could, adding
that the USSR’s slogan of ‘international assistance’ to the Vietnamese
had lost its currency: the Kremlin was open to the idea of ending its
support for Vietnam in the conflicts of South-East Asia.^25 This failed to
calm Deng, who exclaimed that nobody knew the leadership of Viet-
nam better than he did. If the USSR wanted conciliation with China,
Soviet leaders would have to give direct support to the Chinese cause.
His hands shook with anger as he spoke. Deng railed against the Viet-
namese for aiming at a South-East Asian Federation under their aegis.
If he hadn’t already known, Shevardnadze was learning that China
looked on Vietnam and Cambodia as a litmus test of the USSR’s
sincerity in seeking a mending of relations.^26 He was later to recall that
Deng also dwelt on the Chinese territories lost to Russia in the nine-
teenth century. Deng warned: ‘There’ll come a time when China will
perhaps restore them to itself.’^27
No foreign leader had talked so ferociously to Soviet politicians.
Deng was using rudeness to show that China’s future friendship would
not come automatically or cost-free. Shevardnadze could see for him-
self why the Chinese leadership felt such self-confidence. The economic
reforms that Deng had introduced since the late 1970s had released
entrepreneurial energy in the coastal periphery and, with America’s
permission, attracted a huge amount of direct foreign investment. The
contrast with the USSR was unmistakable. Shanghai impressed the
visitors from drab Moscow with its ‘modern culture’ and its ‘business
relations’. The skyscrapers and the shop windows demonstrated the
material progress in the ‘special economic regions’.^28 As Shevardnadze