464 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
forces to the Middle East without prior consultation. Bush accepted
this as ‘constructive criticism’.^5 They agreed that Gorbachëv should
make an overture to Saddam. His public stance aside, Bush expressed
a preference to resolve the emergency by peaceful methods. When he
added that he would welcome the sending of Soviet troops to the Gulf
to strengthen the American contingent, Scowcroft winced at the
thought.^6 Baker tried to win Gorbachëv over by signalling a readiness
to bring American business leaders to Moscow. Gorbachëv welcomed
any help in developing the Tengiz oilfields in western Siberia.^7 He and
Shevardnadze also made a request for a $1.5 billion interest-free loan.
Baker explained that this would be legally impossible for Bush in the
light of outstanding financial grievances that the USSR had yet to
settle with America, but he undertook to ask America’s friends
to advance the money. Gorbachëv warmed to this idea: ‘What is one
billion dollars to an Arab prince who has 104 or 105 billion dollars?’^8
A rift opened between Shevardnadze and Gorbachëv after the
summit when Gorbachëv chose Primakov as the man who went to
Baghdad on his behalf. It was the first time that he overlooked
Shevardnadze for an important mission, and Shevardnadze did not
like it at all.
There had always been some tension in their partnership. As two
strong-minded politicians who had to make judgements in times of
momentous change, they would have hardly been human if they could
agree on everything. In 1986 Shevardnadze had spoken against Gor-
bachëv’s take-it-or-leave-it tactics for talks with the Americans; in
1988 he had opposed the refusal to leave a military contingent behind
in Afghanistan. He disliked his leader’s rhetoric – he cringed when
Gorbachëv talked about ‘our common home’, regardless of where he
might be in the world.^9 But he always accepted that, as a Georgian,
he could never replace Gorbachëv at the helm: ‘I’m . . . convinced
that Mikhail Sergeevich is the only one who can lead the country.’^10
If perestroika met with failure, he added, the result would be ‘anarchy
and chaos’ – and he predicted that those who were likely to replace
Gorbachëv would suppress all dissent.^11 He believed that a dictator
might come to power.^12 Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze, moreover,
managed their disagreements without rancour or public disclosure. The
partner ship worked well enough for Gorbachëv to entrust Shevard-
nadze with a lot of freedom on weighty matters such as policy towards
southern Africa. Shevardnadze’s aides referred to him admiringly as