470 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
his duties effectively unless foreigners saw him as an honourable nego-
tiator. The agreed idea had been for tanks to be converted into
bulldozers, fire engines and cranes. Instead they were being retained
for military use. Shevardnadze asked Gorbachëv to intervene so that a
general disarmament agreement might reach signature before the year
was out.^51 Grinevski wrote to Gorbachëv from Vienna along the same
lines. When Chernyaev joined the chorus, Gorbachëv ordered Yazov
and Zaikov to consult with Shevardnadze about how to resolve the
affair. Gorbachëv claimed to have cursed the offending commanders
in his message to Defence Minister Yazov.^52 The Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty was due for signature on 19 November 1990,
requiring the USSR to reduce its tanks, artillery pieces and armoured
combat vehicles by seventy per cent west of the Urals.^53
While Shevardnadze was savouring his success in persuading Gor-
bachëv about the tanks, he suffered a shock on learning of Gorbachëv’s
latest diplomatic move. Instead of sending him to Baghdad for talks
with Saddam Hussein, he chose Primakov. This infuriated Shevard-
nadze. When Gorbachëv rang him, Shevardnadze motioned to his
aide Tarasenko to stay in the room as a witness. Gorbachëv said that
no harm could come from Primakov’s visit to Baghdad. If former Brit-
ish Prime Minister Edward Heath had gone on a peace mission, why
couldn’t a Soviet public figure do the same?^54 According to Cherny-
aev’s later account, Gorbachëv was merely sending the best man for
the job: Primakov spoke Arabic and was a veteran academic specialist
on the Middle East.^55 Such arguments failed to calm Shevardnadze,
who said to Tarasenko: ‘Who is leading foreign policy? Me or Prima-
kov? Who’s responsible for it? I can’t be the minister if various other
people are going to be involved in affairs that belong to my sphere.’^56
Shevardnadze was quietly disruptive. The Soviet Ambassador to
Jordan told Karen Brutents in the Party International Department that
Shevardnadze ordered him to withhold active help from Primakov’s
mission – apparently Shevardnadze indicated his concern that if the
USSR indulged Saddam, the Saudis would withdraw their promised
loans.^57
Shevardnadze was faltering in his loyalty to Gorbachëv. He saw
the resolution of several urgent problems as requiring a deepened co-
operation with America. These included further agreements on arms
reduction, pan-European military security, the composition of the
Warsaw Pact, Moscow’s treatment of the Soviet Baltic and the collapse
of the USSR’s economy. Whereas Shevardnadze considered the whole