480 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
and, unlike Shevardnadze, failed to understand that a withdrawal of
his forces by Saddam was the last thing that the White House wanted.
Bush aimed to eject Saddam from the annexed territory by force.^44
The Kremlin leadership overlooked the continued concern in the
West about the transfer of the Soviet ‘tank park’ east of the Urals.
Scowcroft wrote to Akhromeev to express disquiet about the situa-
tion. Akhromeev defended the high command. Gorbachëv asked
Zaikov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov and Shevardnadze to investigate
and report. They denied any infringement of the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty since the transfer had occurred before the
treaty’s signature.^45 On 24 December 1990 British diplomat David
Logan complained to Viktor Karpov. Karpov did not deny the undeni-
able but instead told Logan that the USSR was willing to show itself
flexible on the matter.^46
The question of Shevardnadze’s successor caused lively debate.
Gorbachëv’s first preference was for the steady but unimaginative
A. S. Dzasokhov. Shevardnadze’s favoured candidate was the arms
talks expert Kvitsinski.^47 The new cabinet was headed by Valentin
Pavlov, whom Gorbachëv appointed as Prime Minister after Ryzhkov
suffered a heart attack in December. Pavlov was no more enamoured
of ideas for a market economy than Ryzhkov had been. On 15 January
1991 he gave an interview to the Tr u d newspaper claiming he had evi-
dence that the Americans intended to flood the Soviet Union with
50- and 100-ruble notes so as to wreck its economy.^48 Gorbachëv in
the end chose as Shevardnadze’s successor Alexander Bessmertnykh, a
diplomat known for his objections to radicalism in foreign policy.
Shevardnadze vacated his ministry office no. 706 for the last time on
16 January.^49 He maintained contact with the Americans, including
Baker and Matlock, and kept Soviet officials informed about what
passed among them. He avoided saying anything that could embarrass
the Kremlin. When Matlock expressed concern about the Soviet mili-
tary build-up in Latvia, Shevardnadze replied that this was news to
him. He badly wanted to see Baker signing a treaty in Moscow:
‘History won’t forgive a missed opportunity.’^50
Gorbachëv worked to halt the offensive even after the start of
bombing. On 18 January 1991 he phoned Mitterrand and proposed a
joint political initiative. He also called Kohl and congratulated him on
his election as Chancellor of a united Germany. Finally he phoned
Bush. It was a frosty conversation as he tried to get him to order
a pause in hostilities. Bush remained unmoved, and a hitch in the