ENDINGS 493ber he gave official recognition to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as
independent states.^64 But he stopped at this point and waited on
events. Defense Secretary Cheney characteristically demanded a more
active approach. He wanted to base American policy on objective cal-
culation rather than continue to gamble on Gorbachëv and his
survival; he raised an alarm about the spectre of civil war in the USSR.
Cheney wished America to look after its national interests. He had
never been in favour of accelerating the arms cuts as demanded by
official policy. Now he felt able to say this publicly.^65 Scowcroft contra-
dicted him. Whereas Cheney warned about the possible return of an
authoritarian regime in Moscow, Scowcroft reasoned that it made little
sense to undermine Gorbachëv any further – he rejected proposals to
intervene directly in the Soviet republics and welcomed a report from
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since autumn 1989, that
the ‘centre’ retained enough power to control the USSR’s armed forces.
Baker dourly added: ‘The peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union is in
our interests.’ Bush declined to be hurried. He thought it prudent to
see what happened with regard to the new Union Treaty.^66
He made his own contribution to removing the last traces of
tension with the USSR by announcing the decisions to cut down the
American military budget and reduce the number of troops and
weaponry. He reduced the state of alert of US forces around the world.
He confirmed that America would eradicate tactical nuclear weapons
from its stockpiles. He terminated funding for certain strategic mis-
siles programmes. Speaking on television on 27 September, he assured
the American people that no damage would occur to national security.
He celebrated the benefits of a ‘peace dividend’.^67 He phoned Gor-
bachëv to tell him all this on the same day;^68 and Gorbachëv set
reciprocal measures in motion in Moscow.^69 By then Gorbachëv’s
preoccupation was with the economic and constitutional emergency
across the USSR. He could not safely think of anything else. On
7 October an IMF delegation led by Michel Camdessus arrived in
Moscow for talks with Gorbachëv, Yavlinski and others. Budgetary
recovery was the sole topic, and Gorbachëv pressed Camdessus to
avoid administering the medicine too harshly. He spoke as if he was
still genuinely in charge.^70
The truth was that the USSR was on the brink of dissolution. At
the end of October Gorbachëv flew to Madrid for a long-planned con-
ference on the Middle East. While he was there, he called Bush and
pleaded for financial credits. Bush replied that he had to be able to