68 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
I think that the main thing you now need is to select for your-
self some reliable assistants from the circle of dedicated, firm
communists, bind them together, bring the party into the move-
ment, inspire it with the spirit of struggle. This is the key to
success in the literal sense of the word.^14The Cold War was not forgotten:
The aggressive forces of imperialism, especially the Reagan
administration, would love to warm their hands on [the Polish
crisis]. Prodding the Polish counter-revolution towards extremist
actions, they are at the same time openly provoking the socialist
countries, counting on us losing our nerve. They are provoking
direct intervention in Poland and simultaneously trying to find
grounds for accusing the Soviet Union and the socialist countries
of having such intentions.^15The Polish crisis had to be resolved by political methods. If the Soviet
Army moved into Poland, the West would make trouble in Cuba, Viet-
nam or Africa and probably enforce an economic blockade of Eastern
Europe. The USSR had to resist temptation.^16 The Central Committee
endorsed Suslov’s report.^17
Poland’s central bank had foreign debts it could neither pay nor
reschedule. Polish communist leaders had approached the Politburo
for emergency assistance but the scope for a Soviet material subsidy
had narrowed as the USSR’s own financial circumstances took a turn
for the worse; and indeed the economic planners in Moscow were
annoyed that East European countries – not just Poland – were failing
to supply the quantity of industrial goods specified in signed contracts
for Russian oil.^18
At the Politburo on 10 December 1981, Andropov reported that
the KGB was as yet undecided about whether Jaruzelski had definitely
determined to make a move against Solidarity. He admitted to diffi-
culty in increasing economic assistance but set his face against military
intervention. Jaruzelski had stated that Marshal Kulikov, the com-
mander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, promised military help. No one
in the Politburo knew whether Kulikov had said any such thing; but its
members were of a single mind in turning down the idea.^19 The Polit-
buro established its own Polish Commission to keep events under
review. Its first chairman was Suslov, who kept a brake on his instincts:
‘We’ll settle things peacefully even if Solidarity comes to power there.’^20
Ponomarëv of the Party International Department pushed for some