84 World War Two and the Partisan Struggle
at home, and would like to subject it, with our help, to Mihailović, in order to
suffocate it later. This is sewn with a white thread [obvious to everyone]. Those
are shrewd but childish traps! Pity that, for the moment, we can just sympa-
thize with the Partisans and are unable to offer them any practical help.”^192
In spite of these first signs of support there were also rebukes from Moscow.
In February, the Comintern proposed sending a manifesto of endorsement to
various resistance movements in Europe, particularly the French and Czecho-
slovaks. Tito enthusiastically agreed and drafted the text but shortly afterwards
Moscow signaled that, all things considered, it would be better not to publish
it, so as not to worry the royal government in exile, with which diplomatic rela-
tions were resumed even before Hitler’s attack. At the beginning of March, the
Comintern congratulated Broz for his successes, stressing however “that for now
the basic, immediate task, above all others, is to unite all anti-Nazi movements,
crush the invaders, and achieve national liberation.” The Comintern therefore
demanded that he not make trouble for the Soviet government in its relations
with the Western allies. “Grandpa” wrote: “Do not consider your fight only from
your own national standpoint, but also from the international standpoint of the
British-American-Soviet coalition.^193 “A study of all the information you pro-
vide,” Dimitrov wrote further, “gives the impression that the supporters of Great
Britain and the Yugoslav government may be justified in suspecting the Partisan
movement of acquiring a Communist character, and aiming at the Sovietiza-
tion of Yugoslavia. Why, for example, did you need to form a special Proletarian
Brigade?”^194 In short, “Grandpa” counseled Broz to radically review his policy,
and to exploit all possible opportunities to organize a common popular front
against Hitler and Mussolini. He also urged him to bear in mind that “the
Soviet Union has treaty relations with the Yugoslavian king and government,
and that taking an open stand against them would create new difficulties in the
joint war effort.”^195 Tito answered with a cable stressing that the IKKI had mis-
takenly interpreted his information. He was of the opinion that, while the sup-
porters of the government in exile did not collaborate openly with the invaders,
they did so in fact by aiding Nedić’s forces, to which Mihailović had joined his
Chetniks. The CC CPY had at its disposal documents that showed their treach-
ery. He also requested that the CPSU send observers to the liberated territory,
and a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, for all those who wanted
to fight the invader.^196 He was desperately and chronically short of weapons,
which the Partisans were largely obliged to capture from their enemies, wresting
them away with their bare hands. For a while, it seemed that Moscow would,
in fact, send the requested help. Moša Pijade was dispatched to the Durmitor
uplands in Montenegro to organize an airport where Soviet planes could land.
He and his men waited for thirty-seven nights in cold and snow worthy of