World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 93
himself erect even when he was dead weary. In that very difficult period...
he filed his finger nails daily... I think that, subconsciously, he developed the
need for a bit of bravado, for personifying the pride of his ragged, half-starved
army and the working people generally.”^233 In the following months, his cult of
personality spread rapidly: in 1944 the Party propagandists were instructed to
always mention Tito’s name along with that of Stalin. Tito was certainly very
much aware of his importance and historical role.^234
Operation WeissThe increase in guerrilla warfare came as a disagreeable surprise to the Ger-
mans, who were convinced that the British would exploit it in order to organize
a landing in the Balkans, and who were skeptical about the capacity of their
Italian allies to defend the coast from Trieste to Corfu. As early as 24 Septem-
ber 1941, Joachim von Ribbentrop wrote in a note: “This area will be considered
by England as a center of unrest, and the main base for a European moment of
rebellion; and for English planes, submarines, explosives, English propaganda
and intelligence. The need, therefore, arises for Italy and Germany to pacify
the region and restore order.”^235 In November 1942, Hitler received Pavelić at
Vinnytsia, his general headquarters in Ukraine, and between 18 and 20 Decem-
ber he convened an Italo-German conference at Rastenburg in Eastern Prus-
sia. Ribbentrop and Mussolini’s foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, took part,
together with military experts, to discuss how best to restore order in the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia. On that occasion, Hitler reaffirmed his belief that a
British landing in southeastern Europe was possible, expressing the opinion
that such an event could have serious consequences, since it would induce the
Turks to enter the war on the British side. He stressed, however, that the land-
ing could not take place as long as the Axis powers held Rhodes, the Dodeca-
nese Islands, Crete, Greece, Albania, Dalmatia, and its hinterland: “Everything
depends on crushing all nationalist and Communist revolt there.”^236 On that
occasion, and in the subsequent meeting in Rome on 3 January 1943, the Axis
decided to exploit the Chetniks in the fight against the communists and then
to eliminate them. This was the only concession that the Führer made to the
Italians, who insisted on keeping the Serb nationalists in their service. Resum-
ing these discussions, General Alexander Löhr who, in August 1942 had been
appointed commander in chief of the German Army Group Southeast, wrote
in a memorandum, “The liberation of the hinterland must be completed—and
by the end of March.”^237
When the fortunes of war turned against the Axis because of the Wehr-
macht’s defeat at Stalingrad, they initiated Operation Weiss, or the Fourth