World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 97
Germans.^254 The exchange of a German major who had been taken prisoner
offered an opportunity for him to propose a cease-fire, which was desperately
needed in order to give him the breathing space to liquidate the Chetniks. At
the time, he did not know that Operation Weiss had fizzled out and that the
Germans were unwilling to pursue him across the Neretva. Before making this
fateful decision, he called a meeting of his collaborators, at which Djilas asked:
“And what will the Russians say?” Tito, who had already vaguely informed
Grandpa of his intentions to contact the Germans, answered dryly: “They also
think, first of all, of their people and army.”^255
On 11 March 1943, negotiations were arranged between the two parties in
Gorni Vakuf, not far from Jajce. Milovan Djilas, Vlatko Velebit, and Koča
Popović informed their Nazi counterparts that, for the time being, the national
liberation forces did not intend to fight them, as shown by the fact that they
only defended themselves when attacked. Their only aim was to destroy the
Chetniks. The three also affirmed that their movement was completely in-
dependent, and that they had joined the Soviets only for propaganda reasons.
If there was to be a British landing on the Dalmatian coast, the Partisans would
oppose it while the Chetniks would not. On the contrary, the Chetniks were in
contact with London, with the connivance of the Italians. Tito’s delegates also
wanted the Germans to recognize the Partisans as a “militant party,” which
would oblige them to respect the laws and customs of war, especially regarding
the treatment of prisoners.^256
The Germans behaved like gentlemen, praising Tito’s combatants for their
bravery and their treatment of prisoners. It seemed that an agreement was
within arm’s reach. To show his good will, Tito even ordered the Partisans in
Slavonia to stop sabotaging the Zagreb-Belgrade railway, as the Germans re-
quested.^257 Referring to the aforementioned proposals, Siegfried Kasche sent
a dispatch to Berlin on 17 March 1943, counseling “that the possibility should
be seized, since the defection of this world-famous fighting force from our
enemies would be very significant. Actually the bulk of Tito’s Partisans are not
Communist, and have in general committed no unusual excesses in fighting,
in the treatment of prisoners and the population.”^258
In the days that followed, negotiations continued at Sarajevo and Zagreb,
where Velebit and Djilas represented the Partisans. Kasche informed both the
Croatian foreign minister and the Italian envoy, who were in agreement with
him, that the possibility of a cease fire should be examined further. The Italian
military were also greatly interested in a cease-fire with Tito. But on 29 March,
the Berlin Foreign Ministry abruptly ordered that the talks be suspended.
Two reasons were given: “not only mistrust of Tito’s promises... but primarily
the fear that the Italians would exploit the German agreements with him to