World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 99
Operation SchwarzThe ability of the Partisans to offer resistance to six German and four Italian
divisions, in addition to consistent attacks by Chetnik forces, had notable sig-
nificance in terms of politics, strategy, and morale. Among other things, it
induced the Soviet Union to resume its pressure on the Yugoslav government
in exile concerning its attitude toward Mihailović, which it did with a note
dated 2 April 1943.^266 Interest in the Balkan area was also revived in British
circles. Although they had long been deluded by the Serb nationalist move-
ment, they began to realize that, in the case of an Allied landing in Sicily, the
Yugoslav “Communist” rebels could play an important role, since they would be
able to block substantial enemy forces on the eastern side of the Adriatic.
Meanwhile, Mihailović inadvertently did everything in his power to dig
his own grave. In order to have a clear idea about his intentions and his opera-
tive capabilities, the British sent a mission to his headquarters led by Colonel
William S. Bailey, one of their best experts on Yugoslavia and one of the lead-
ing SOE men. Relations between the two parties rapidly deteriorated, since
Mihailović was angry at the British because he believed he had not received
enough aid from them. On 28 February 1943, at a baptism in a Montenegrin
village, having drunk too much rakija, he launched into a bitter tirade against
the Allies, stressing that his enemies were the Partisans, the Ustaša, and the
Muslims, in that order. He would fight them and only after their defeat would
he turn against the Germans. As for the Italians, they were his only source
of supplies and no pressure or menace would compel him to abandon them.
This outburst, duly registered by Bailey, came to Churchill’s attention, who
reacted with a note of protest to the Yugoslav government, informing them
that unless Mihailović changed his attitude toward the Italians and his Yugo-
slav compatriots, His Majesty’s Government would be obliged to review its
policy toward him and provide assistance to other resistance movements in
Yugoslavia instead.^267 This warning was eloquent enough, although it did not
reveal the fact that London had already begun to consider three possible moves
in Yugoslavia: first, to force the Chetniks to collaborate with the Partisans, if
necessary with Soviet help; second, to divide the country between the two
enemy forces along the Ibar River in Serbia, allowing Mihailović to control the
area to the east; or if this were not possible, then third, to transfer all their aid
from Mihailović to Tito. The London branch of the SOE and the Foreign
Office did not look on this last solution favorably since they knew that, in that
case, the whole of Yugoslavia would be consigned to the communists. After
long discussions, Churchill’s request that above all it was necessary to support
those who would “kill more Germans” prevailed.^268