Tito and His Comrades

World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 111

it is evident that prohibiting Tempo from pursuing this plan was in accordance
with Stalin’s policy.^315
In extending his activity to the south, Tito was well aware that he could not
speak in the name of Yugoslavia until he set foot in Serbia, which was still under
the Germans. (Among 150,000 Partisans who were under Tito’s direct command
at the end of 1943, only two thousand were in eastern Yugoslavia, and they were
in poor shape).^316 In October 1943, he decided the time had come to shift the
focal point of military operations across the Drina, but this proposal was thwarted
by a vigorous Wehrmacht offensive during the winter, an attempt to occupy the
territory evacuated by the Italians. In Slovenia, Istria, Gorski Kotar, Dalmatia,
Herzegovina, and Sandžak, heavy fighting raged for nearly three months between
Partisan and German troops for control of the coast and the lines of commu-
nication with the hinterland. In Slovenia, the Wehrmacht could count on the
Domobranci (Home Guards) as local collaborators in combat, while in Monte-
negro with the help of the Chetniks and the Albanians they organized a vast
operation to block the passage of Partisans into Serbia, “this irreplaceable bul-
wark for the defense of the Balkans,” as Hitler called it in one of his messages.^317

The Second Session of AVNOJ

In spite of furious fighting, Tito and his comrades did not abandon their idea
of convoking the Second AVNOJ. The preparatory work was done mostly by
Edvard Kardelj, Boris Kidrič, and Moša Pijade, formerly Tito’s cellmate in the
royal jails and one of the most accomplished intellectuals in his circle. As in the
previous year, the Politburo discussed and approved the decisions to be taken
by the Second AVNOJ in advance. By the end of October it had already decided
that the assembly would create a provisional government, proclaim the unity of
the Yugoslav peoples within the framework of a federation, and forbid the king
to return home until the people decided whether they wanted a monarchy or a
republic. While making these decisions, they could not help but ask themselves
what the Soviet reaction would be, since signs of Moscow’s disapproval of their
overly independent policy were becoming increasingly frequent.
By mid-September the Bulgarian communist Sterju Atanasov had arrived at
the Supreme Staff. He was the first man from Moscow Tito had met in some
time. He informed Tito that a conference was in preparation in the Soviet
capital between the foreign ministers of the Great Powers. Fearing that Viach-
eslav Molotov, Anthony Eden, and Cordell Hull might take decisions at odds
with his plans, on 12 October 1943 Broz sent Dimitrov a dispatch in which he
stated explicitly that King Petar and his government could not return home.^318
In addition, he presented himself, although circumspectly, as the future leader of
Yugoslavia, communicating that “in Slovenia and in Croatia they have proposed