World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 119
English and Americans were, but at the AVNOJ.^362 For the Yugoslav commu-
nists, this was undoubtedly an important achievement. In spite of an initial
coldness due to the formal behavior of the Soviets, a genuine comradeship soon
emerged between them and the Yugoslavs. In honor of the newcomers, Tito
organized a reception on 24 February, for the first time sporting his marshal
uniform.^363 Two or three weeks after their arrival he told his collaborators,
with embarrassment and pride, how Korneev, when drunk, embraced and
kissed him, calling him “Oska, Oska,” the Russian nickname for Josip.^364 In an
interview given in April to Joseph Morton from the United Press—the first
given to a foreign correspondent—he stressed the fact that there were no “pro-
Soviet elements” in the Partisan movement, although it was actually quite the
opposite.^365
In the spring of 1944, Tito and his comrades found themselves in the pleas-
ant situation of a girl courted by two suitors: the Russians and the British
outdid each other in praising the success of the Partisans’ guerilla tactics.
According to the British, after the war a string of friendly monarchies should
be established in the Mediterranean area, in Italy, Albania, Yugoslavia, and
Greece. This project was dear to Churchill, not only because of his royalist
sympathies but also because he was convinced that these monarchies would
be an instrument of British domination in their respective countries. In short,
Sir Winston, trusting his diplomatic ability, changed horses mid-race in Yugo-
slavia, sure he would emerge victorious and in indirect control. However,
he found in Tito a worthy adversary who was able to dissimulate his intentions,
to engage in dialogue without showing all his cards, and who was ever ready
to exploit the increasingly available Allied supplies to strengthen his forces.
Thanks to the stubbornness of the Serb members of the government in exile,
Tito succeeded in postponing Churchill’s request for talks about his collabora-
tion with the king until late spring, a delay that gave him extra time to send his
Partisan units to Serbia and reinforce the national liberation movement there.
This significantly changed the balance of power in his favor.^366
In hopes of reaching an agreement with Tito about the monarchy, in the
first months of 1944 Churchill tried to convince King Petar II to repudiate
Mihailović. This was not easy, since the Serb coterie surrounding the sovereign
vehemently opposed such a move. The British prime minister was obviously not
a man to allow his plans to be hindered by the “imbroglios of Serbian politics.”
He initially considered organizing a coup against the Chetnik leader, but aban-
doned this proposal when he realized there were no officers in Mihailović’s
camp capable of implementing one. “A pity,” commented Eden, adding that
in order to expel Mihailović, the Yugoslav government in exile had to be over-
thrown as soon as possible.^367 At the beginning of March 1944, Petar II returned