World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 121
leaders’ infatuation with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Djilas was sure that
there would be words of praise in the Kremlin for a mission accomplished, and
indeed there were. Stalin was even momentarily annoyed when Djilas asked
him for a loan to pay for arms, hastening to assure him that it would be hon-
ored when the war was over. “You offend me. You shed your blood and think
that I could take money for arms. I am not a trafficker, we are not traffickers!”^371
After his meeting with the Boss, Djilas came to the conclusion that the Yugo-
slav communists could count on Soviet aid, but that for opportunistic reasons
they needed to maintain good relations with the Western Allies, although not
without circumspection, since they were capable of hitting below the belt. Sta-
lin hinted that the Yugoslavs should not even exclude the possibility of an
Allied attempt to assassinate Tito. This was the beginning of a subtle game of
politics between the Yugoslavs, the Soviets, and the British, whose objective
was to gain political influence in the Balkans, leaning only on the conviction
that the Germans had to be ousted first.^372
The positive results of Djilas’s meetings with Stalin and his top collabora-
tors soon became apparent. On 22 April 1944, the Soviets communicated to
the British that they would, from then on, collaborate more intensively with
Tito. In agreement with the Allies, a Red Army base with ten transport aircraft
was set up in Bari, so that supplies could be flown in for the National Libera-
tion Army. They also sent medals and decorations to the leaders of the Yugo-
slav resistance, as if they were part of their military. Churchill, of course, kept a
wary eye on events and began thinking about the division of spheres of influ-
ence in the Balkans.^373
In Tito’s Supreme Staff, these maneuvers were looked upon with growing
concern, as evident proof of British imperialistic aims. The marshal remained
calm and even subtly countered Churchill’s argument that the Serbs did not
support him. In an interview with British and American journalists, published
by the Times on 16 May 1944, he stressed that his forces were composed of
44 percent Serbs, 30 percent Croats, 10 percent Slovenes, 5 percent Montene-
grins, 2.5 percent Muslims, and 6 percent “others,” including Italians. He
neglected to say that most of the Serbs came from Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia and that, in Serbia proper, the results of his efforts to encourage the
revolt were still modest, albeit growing.^374 He was heartened, however, by the
fact that he could count on Russian support. In mid-April, he sent a dispatch
to Moscow once more protesting the attitude of the Bulgarians and of Dimi-
trov himself toward the Macedonian question—they still persisted in consider-
ing Mace donia as part of greater Bulgaria. Stalin answered through General
Korneev with a conciliatory letter, promising that he would not accept any
decision regarding the question “without your agreement.” In addition, he