World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 143
he protested officially to the new chief of the Soviet military mission, General
K. V. Kiselev, stressing that from now on his attitude toward all the Allies
would be the same. The rift deepened even further in March 1945, when the
marshal constituted his provisional government. In addition to Šubašić, who
was nominated minister of foreign affairs, among its thirty members there was
also Milan Grol, leader of the Serb Democratic Party. According to Kardelj, he
was “an autonomous and prestigious man, but a reactionary who did not agree
with us on practically anything.”^483 Tito included him in his cabinet in order to
show his independence to Stalin and to satisfy Churchill. The Soviets, informed
by the British about this surprising nomination, were furious as they had ex-
pected their candidate, the former royal ambassador in Moscow, Stanoje Simić,
to be appointed instead. Aside from this, they considered the solemn declara-
tion that the new government addressed to the international community to be
“very wishy-washy.” In a top secret letter sent on 11 March 1945 to Tito, Kardelj,
and Hebrang, they observed that there was no mention in this document of
the collaboration between the Slavic countries and no expression of gratitude
toward the Soviet Union for the liberation of Serbia. The letter continued,
“This silence cannot be helpful to democratic Yugoslavia.” According to the
Soviet government, these omissions were due “to pressure by Šubašić and Grol
who, from the very beginning, had negatively influenced the line taken by dem-
ocratic Yugoslavia.”^484 Tito answered that the nomination of Grol was dictated
with the conviction that his presence would tame “the reactionary Serb bloc,”
stressing that without such a decision the Westerners “would never recognize
the new government.” Even so, the incident preoccupied him considerably, as
shown by a dispatch sent to Dimitrov and intercepted by the British. In it, he
anxiously asked: “What is my relation with Filipov like?”^485
Filipov, alias Stalin, reacted immediately in his brusque manner, answer-
ing that he did not agree with Tito’s explanation. The same day, on 15 March
1945, the new premier hurriedly convened the Politburo members who made
amends for their errors in a letter, promising that from now on they would ask
Moscow for advice on everything, since Yugoslavia had only one choice: “to
proceed in accordance with the Soviet Union and under its direction.”^486 In
spite of their humble repentance, a new incident soon followed: Tito organized
a reception for the ambassadors of Great Britain and the United States, who
had just arrived in Belgrade. The place of honor was given to the king of Eng-
land’s envoy, although Stalin’s representative, Ivan V. Sadchikov, had arrived in
Yugoslavia before him and according to protocol should have had precedence.
Again, sounds of protest could be heard from the Kremlin.^487
Churchill knew nothing of these disagreements. Convinced he had lost out
in Yugoslavia, he quickly adapted his policy to the new situation. In a note sent