The Postwar Period 151
of threat felt by Yugoslav leaders because of this sudden quarrel only confirmed
their conviction that captured collaborators should not be treated as prisoners
of war, but should be “liquidated” as soon as possible, since it was feared that
they could switch sides and ally themselves with the Westerners in case of an
armed clash. Approximately thirty thousand collaborators managed to make
their way to southern Carinthia, hoping to find shelter with the British who
occupied the region. But the British felt no mercy for the former vassals of
Hitler despite their tensions with Tito and tricked them, saying they would be
sent to safety in Italy, when in fact they were returned home, although it would
have been difficult not to imagine the fate awaiting them there.^4 The massacre
that followed was discussed several times in Tito’s inner circle, including at a
Belgrade meeting of the heads of OZNA chaired by Ranković in late Decem-
ber 1944. On that occasion they decided that all members of the Quisling units
would be executed by special Partisan detachments, a decision most likely con-
firmed in Zagreb at a top-secret meeting between Tito and the senior army
commanders who were reviewing military strategy.^5 When the British began
to return prisoners in the second half of May 1945, a colonel came to Slovenia
bearing a letter from Ranković, addressed to the local OZNA head, Matija
Maček, saying that the “justification” should be carried out.^6
The settling of scores was brutal: thousands of collaborators were shot in
Slovenia, or forced on “death marches” to hurriedly organized concentration
camps in other republics where they were to be interned. Few reached the
camps alive.^7 The massacre, whose victims also included followers of Mihailo-
vić, Nedić, and Dimitrije Ljotić, descended into anarchy. According to some
contemporaries, this disturbed Tito. Still, he stood firm on its necessity. On 26
May, speaking for the first time in the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana, before an
enormous audience, he said of the enemy collaborators: “The hand of justice,
the hand of our people’s revenge, has already reached the majority of them, and
only a small number of traitors managed to escape our country, under the pro-
tection of foreign supporters. This minority will never again see our majestic
mountains and blooming meadows. And if they should see them again, it won’t
be for long.”^8
Tito never regretted the killings, which were carried out in secret (although
of course they could not be completely hidden). On the contrary, he believed
they were more than justified, especially when in 1948 he argued with the omnip-
otent Kremlin “Boss,” Josef Dzhugashvili, known to all by his nickname, Stalin.
In case of a probable Soviet invasion, these fiercely anti-regime men could join
the aggressors. “Then,” he said later, “there was no Soviet military attack against
us, because Yugoslavia was unified and the country’s various reactionary ele-
ments had been too weakened during the national liberation struggle to carry