The Postwar Period 153
members were from the military) had at its disposal a network of commit-
tees that kept the masses under control.^16 In addition, there was OZNA, which
fought enemies both internal and external. If claims from the time are to be
believed, it was kept busy with the 826 hostile groups comprised of six thou-
sand “terrorists” or armed opponents sent by American and British intelligence
to Yugoslavia in the first two years after the war alone.^17 It has to be said, how-
ever, that the majority of the population believed in the values of the Popular
Front, as organized and led by the CPY, and that any “bourgeois” forces were
largely discredited and impotent. As Tito later affirmed, the Provisional Gov-
ernment created the illusion among the opposition and abroad that all was not
yet lost, but those around him knew his plans very well: to quickly bring about
a revolution, regardless of the West and its generous aid, which was offered—
mostly by the United States—through the United Nations Relief and Rehabili-
tation Administration. “We marched toward the construction of socialism with
a zeal never seen before,” boasted Tito.^18
The quartet on the top divided Yugoslavia into fiefdoms. Tito, who was the
most powerful and a good twenty years older than the others, dominated every-
thing, especially—with the help of Kardelj—the situation in Croatia. Slovenia
was also Kardelj’s region, while Ranković and Djilas were in charge of Serbia and
Montenegro and, through their subordinates, also oversaw Macedonia, Kosovo,
Vojvodina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.^19 The division of power was also clear on
another level: Kardelj supervised the social system and foreign policy; Ranković
was in charge of internal matters; while propaganda, indoctrination, and control-
ling intellectual life were handed over to Djilas. Together with Tito, this group of
men made all the important decisions and subsequently presented them to the
Politburo, where they were rubber-stamped. Power at a lower level was exercised
by young people, between fifteen and thirty years old, who fought as Partisans
and were chosen because of their “revolutionary” zeal. They carried out their
duties tentatively, often having no idea about the problems they were supposed
to be dealing with. Most of them had very little education, as many had not
completed their primary schooling. This generation would stay in office for the
next thirty-five years and occasionally longer, until the collapse of Yugoslavia.^20
Nationalization and Agrarian ReformYugoslavia also underwent radical social change during this period, thanks to
the Politburo’s decision to nationalize the means of production with all possible
speed. Many opposed this step, seeing it as premature and fearing its negative
impact on the regime’s popular support. They felt it was unwise to be so hasty:
better to nationalize each economic sector individually, one at a time. This view
was echoed by Moscow, which was apprehensive about a possible worsening of