156 The Postwar Period
officers who had participated in military and counterespionage courses in Mos-
cow, he boldly described how his troops would march on Trieste, though he did
not hide the fact that opposition from the Western allies was to be expected.^31
After two weeks in Russia, he returned home feeling sure of Stalin’s support, as
confirmed in a report given to the Politburo: “They welcomed us with open
arms. The Soviet Union will help us by any means.”^32 Knowing there was no
time to lose, he ordered the local authorities in Slovenia and Croatia to take
immediate power in the disputed region and to guard it against any possible
advance by English and American troops—even if this meant an armed clash.
Meanwhile, the Fourth Army was ordered to rush towards Trieste, the main
port of Venezia Giulia, in order to occupy the area and to reach the Isonzo
River before the Allies, who were racing there from the Italian peninsula.^33
On 1 May 1945, the Fourth Army and the Ninth Corps of the Slovene Par-
tisan forces entered Trieste and Gorizia, accomplishing a long-held dream of the
Slovene nation. The English and Americans immediately requested their with-
drawal, in accordance with the agreement made between Tito and Alexander.
On 6 May, the Yugoslav government contacted the Soviets to secure their help.
The answer that came from Moscow on 11 May was promising, but diplomati-
cally ambiguous: “The Government of the Soviet Union will collaborate with
all powers, so that Yugoslavia’s just claims can be achieved peacefully.”^34 But it
was soon clear that this “collaboration” would not be simple, as relations be-
tween Belgrade and the West worsened further, and the issue acquired increased
political significance. By banishing Yugoslavia from Trieste and Gorizia, Win-
ston Churchill and Harry S Truman, the new president of the United States,
sought to show Stalin that they would not allow his influence to creep over the
demarcation line dividing Europe into two blocs. In a proclamation to the
troops, Field Marshal Alexander went so far as to compare Tito with Hitler,
Mussolini, and Imperial Japan, denouncing his “territorial aggression.”^35
In pursuit of their aim, Churchill and Truman even threatened armed in-
tervention, which the Yugoslav leadership saw as an attempt to divide their
country. The situation was also viewed seriously in Moscow, where Tito’s stub-
bornness was not appreciated and where there were fears that it could lead to an
armed confrontation with the West, something the Soviet Union was not ready
for. It was true that Stalin saw a war with the capitalist world as inevitable; for
example, he had spoken openly about future conflict with the West to Moša
Pijade and other guests at his dacha in January 1945. But not an immediate
conflict.^36 Stalin was convinced that the Yugoslavs deserved Trieste, as it had
been annexed by the Italians after the First World War and used as a spring-
board for their aggression against the Balkans, causing great suffering. He said
this quite clearly in his correspondence with Truman and Churchill, protesting