The Postwar Period 163
The West’s hostility toward Tito was articulated most powerfully by Churchill
who, having been defeated by Labour at the polls, could now speak freely without
diplomatic restraint. In Brussels in January 1946, he declared in a private conver-
sation: “During the war I thought I could trust Tito. He promised me to observe
the agreement he had concluded with Šubašić, but now I am well aware that I
committed one of my biggest mistakes of the war.”^75 The following April, during
a tour of the United States, Churchill gave a speech at Westminster College in
Missouri. In it he described the conditions prevailing in Europe after the war,
using the famous metaphor of the iron curtain dividing the continent in two,
from Stettin to Trieste. Stalin protested against those words, which foreshad-
owed the Cold War. Five days later, Tito declared that he agreed with the Boss.^76
In the following months relations between the two blocs deteriorated rap-
idly, which affected the negotiations of the foreign ministers of the four great
powers (now including France) about the new border between Yugoslavia and
Italy. Yugoslavia asked that the frontier lie on the Isonzo River, but because the
West considered this proof of Soviet territorial ambition, no one but Molotov
agreed. In June 1946, after protracted discussions, a compromise was reached
in Paris: Yugoslavia could have the valleys of Isonzo and Vipava and most of
the Karst region, but not Gorizia. Along the gulf of Trieste, from Duino near
Monfalcone to Novigrad in Istria, there would be a Free Territory of Trieste,
which would take the city from Italy but close off Slovenia’s access to the sea.
When Kardelj, who was outraged by this outcome, which he felt was a national
catastrophe, flung this compromise in Molotov’s face, the Soviet foreign min-
ister replied angrily, “But do you think every ‘gubernia’ can have its own sea?”
This was taken by the Slovenians as a deliberate affront to their Republic, which
Molotov considered a mere province.^77
British and American hostility toward Tito’s regime provoked more than
two thousand incidents on its terrestrial and maritime borders in the first few
years after the war. “Our Foreign Ministry,” recalled Tito, “protested many
times against this brutal violation of our sovereignty, but to no avail.”^78 During
the Paris discussions, Yugoslavia’s air space was routinely invaded—in June
1946 alone there were around 170 non-authorized militarily flights—provoking
Tito to take drastic action.^79 When the Paris Peace Conference opened its
doors, he ordered his army to force American planes to land. The first time this
manoeuver was successful but the second time, on 19 August 1946, the pilot
refused to comply. The aircraft was attacked and, in the subsequent crash, two
crew members died. There was hysterical outrage in the United States, prompt-
ing Washington to demand the release of the survivors who had been taken
prisoner and payment of hefty compensation to the families of the dead.^80 This
atmosphere, so strained that an armed conflict could not be ruled out, was