The Postwar Period 175
an East European bloc in collaboration with the USSR.... The international
press could present this as an anti-American and anti-British move by the
USSR, smoothing the way for the most aggressive Anglo-American elements
in their fight against the democratic forces in the USA and Great Britain.”^141
Stalin’s concerns were further heightened by Tito’s proposal to send a divi-
sion to South Albania, which was under threat from Greece for helping the
rebel communist forces. He would establish a Yugoslav military base in the
town of Korça as a warning to the West not to play with fire.^142 Tito made this
bold decision despite the fact that, in August 1947, Stalin had advised him to be
prudent. In response to Tito’s suggestion that the Greek Communist Party be
invited to Szklarska Poręba, the Boss had replied that its presence would only
aid the Anglo-American agenda. It was clear that the arrival of Yugoslav mili-
tary units in South Albania, as requested in June 1946 by Enver Hoxha,
the secretary general of the Albanian Communist Party, could trigger conflict
not only between Yugoslav and Greek troops, but also with the “Anglo-Saxons”
fighting in Epir for the government of Athens and possibly even with the
Americans. This could easily transform the Cold War into a hot one, a chal-
lenge that Stalin could do without given his interest in finding, for now, a
modus vivendi with the West.^143
As Ambassador Lavrent’ev wrote on 21 January 1948, even worse was the fact
that Tito had made his decision without informing Soviet military counselors
in the Yugoslav Army. (Djilas later said that he and Kardelj were likewise
unaware of this.) Enver Hoxha, who had lost all enthusiasm for Tito as his
relations with Belgrade had cooled, hurried to inform Stalin. The latter
responded that he “did not see any imminent threat of an attack against you by
the Greek army.” At the end of January, Molotov sent Tito a message saying
that the “Anglo-Saxons” might interpret the arrival of Yugoslav troops as an
occupation, and use it as a pretext to enter Albania. During a conversation with
Lavrent’ev, Tito immediately declared his willingness to postpone or even can-
cel the planned deployment of troops. He warned, however, that if South Alba-
nia was invaded by the imperialists, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would
both be forced to swallow this “pigswill.”^144 In response, on 1 February, two
telegrams came from Moscow in which Molotov noted angrily that this unduly
independent behavior by the Yugoslav government was “anomalous” and intol-
erable. “It’s clear that there are serious disagreements between our two govern-
ments on the matter of bilateral relations. To avoid any further misunderstand-
ings, we must clear things up definitively.”^145
Dimitrov took up Stalin’s invitation, leaving Sofia for Moscow, in secret, on
9 February. Tito, however, showed again that he understood with whom he was
dealing. Since the hernia surgery he had undergone the previous year, he had