The Postwar Period 177
Stalin complained that he was not willing to tolerate satellite countries acting
bilaterally and even less willing to allow them to muddy the waters with the
West without his agreement. “Everything Dimitrov or Tito says is reported
abroad, as if we already knew about it.”^152 The Kremlin meeting, which began
at 10 p.m., was over by 11:45 p.m. Stalin, who reproached Dimitrov for behaving
like a gossipy old woman—though he maintained a more respectful attitude
toward the Yugoslavs—did not invite anyone to dinner.^153
The next day, to avoid future misunderstandings, Dimitrov and Kardelj
were asked to sign a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union renouncing
any claim to independent foreign policy and promising “to consult Moscow in
all important international questions.” Kardelj, who on 11 February was sum-
moned to the Kremlin in the middle of the night to sign the document, tried
to comfort himself with the thought that the Russians had essentially asked
for something he was already doing. Still, he was so bewildered that he signed
it in the wrong place, causing the entire document to be retyped and the cere-
mony repeated the following day.^154 Afterward, the Yugoslav delegation stayed
in Moscow for two or three more days, during which it had discussions with
Dimitrov, among others, on how to bring about the federation between their
countries, as Stalin had requested at the Kremlin. Unlike the “mythical” confed-
eration of all people’s democracies that Dimitrov wanted, Stalin considered this
“feasible and realistic.”^155 Kardelj took part in talks with the Bulgarian leader,
having already told Djilas when they left the Kremlin that on the basis of deci-
sions taken by the Politburo CPY before his departure, a federation with the
Bulgarians was out of the question: “Such a federation would allow Stalin to
bring a Trojan horse into our camp.” The Yugoslavs left the Soviet capital
almost in secret. According to Kardelj, “They took us to Vnukovo airport at
dawn, and unceremoniously made us board the plane.”^156
Meanwhile, ominous signs were coming one after the other. Even before the
Yugoslav delegation returned from Moscow, news arrived from Bucharest that
Tito’s portrait had disappeared from shop windows. And from Tirana, the
Yugoslav Embassy brought news that the Soviet chargé d’affaires had toasted
Tito during a reception, but “only if what he does really strengthens the inter-
national democratic front.” To make things even more uncomfortable, ten days
later the Yugoslav minister of foreign trade, Bogdan Crnobrnja, was told in
Moscow that discussions on the renewal of economic agreements between the
two countries were postponed until the end of the year.^157
When Djilas, Bakarić, and Kardelj returned home from Moscow on 19 Feb-
ruary 1948, the Politburo was summoned, and Djilas reported back on their
discussions with Stalin and other Soviet leaders. Tito did not seem bothered
by the issue of foreign policy, still convinced that in that respect there were