180 The Postwar Period
representatives in Belgrade. It had not been implemented, however, for the
Soviet trade attaché. In his letter Lavrent’ev wrote that now the Yugoslav gov-
ernment has changed its attitude. According to him, the fact that the Soviet
Embassy had again been formally notified of this prohibition could mean
only one thing: the Yugoslav government’s attitude toward the Soviet Union
had changed.^167 Two days later, on 11 March, Tito met with Lavrent’ev to tell
him that his government could not understand why the Soviet Union refused
to sign their trade agreement, despite regularly signing similar agreements with
other countries. Tito also brought up other questions, such as the toast made
by the Soviet diplomat in Tirana, though he tried to keep things amicable,
saying that quarrels could happen in any family, even between brothers. Molo-
tov answered from Moscow that reports about the toast had been misunder-
stood, if not entirely made up, and that the same thing could be said about
the Soviet Union’s refusal to sign the trade agreement. Meanwhile, Žujović
continued to stoke the fire: in his discussions with Soviet diplomats he spoke
about Tito, Kardelj, Ranković, and Djilas as “political zealots,” ready to bring
about socialism in Yugoslavia “their way.” This was why they wanted to keep
their distance from the Soviet Union and why they emphasized their criti-
cism of it.^168
Troubled by such reports, Stalin took an unforeseen step. On 19 March 1948,
he ordered the head of the Soviet military mission in Yugoslavia to inform
Koča Popović, the chief of the General Staff, that his government had decided
to recall all military “counselors” from what was now a hostile environment.
The next day the Soviet chargé d’affaires informed Tito that civil counselors
had also been recalled, adding by way of explanation: “You do not listen to us!”
Both kinds of counselors were, in fact, hugely unpopular, thanks to their supe-
rior attitude, enormous salaries, and attempts to plant informers in important
military and economic positions. “They wanted to shape Yugoslavia according
to their own views, introducing Soviet customs,” Tito said later. “At a stroke,
they wanted to transform us into a mere Russian gubernia outpost.”^169 But the
sudden departure of Soviet personnel was so sinister that it provoked concern.
Tito sent two letters to Molotov in which he refuted accusations that the coun-
selors had been treated with hostility and that Yugoslav bureaucrats had been
reluctant to work with them. “We want the Soviet government to tell us frankly
what the matter is—what, in its opinion, is preventing harmony between our
two nations.”^170
Kardelj, for his part, tried to convince Molotov to allow at least those civil
experts who were essential to the completion of Soviet-backed projects to re-
main in Yugoslavia. But to no avail: on 27 March, this group too was obliged to
return home. That day Molotov informed Lavrent’ev that he had sent an envoy