184 The Postwar Period
Union had been compromised irredeemably: “I know the Russians... I know
their way of thinking. They’d call us Fascists if it would morally and politically
justify a war against us. If they could, they’d destroy us by force.”^180
Tito convened the secret session of the CC on 12 April 1948, at ten o’clock
in the morning in the library of the Old Palace. This was an unusual place for
a party meeting, and Tito had chosen it in hopes that it had not been bugged
by the Soviets. There was also little danger there of an attack by air or from the
surrounding areas.^181 Tito approached the meeting with an acute understand-
ing of its “fundamental importance.” “Life has taught me,” he explained, “that
in situations like this, the most dangerous thing to do is not to have steady
convictions, and to waver. In these situations, it’s vital to act bravely and
firmly.”^182 After a few words of welcome, during which he outlined the recent
disagreement with Stalin, he read the letter of 27 March, along with his own
reply. At the end, he called the gathering’s attention to one critical point: all the
ideological accusations were just a smokescreen hiding the real issue, which was
the relationship between the two countries. He also asked his comrades to
voice their opinions on the “terrible lies” they had heard, and so as to remind
them of their responsibilities, he said that minutes would be taken and passed
on, if requested, to the CC of the CPSU. They had to make a firm choice
between Tito and Stalin. There was nowhere to hide.^183
With this, he opened the floor to a series of comments, some better articu-
lated than others, some more emotionally charged. Kardelj noted that Yugosla-
via had secured its freedom by itself, whereas Czechoslovakia and other people’s
democracies had been liberated by the Red Army. “We have fought for our
liberty,” he argued, “therefore we deserve to be respected.” Djilas, who was always
inclined to exaggerate, declared that having been accused by Stalin of Trot sky-
ism, he had but one choice: suicide. However, all supported Tito’s view: “We
have the right to negotiate with the Soviet Union as equals.” But when it was
Žujović’s turn, he became “pale and upset,” and defended the Soviet position:
“Comrades! I appeal to your revolutionary consciences.... What role will
Yugoslavia have in the struggle with imperialism? I think our aim should be to
unite Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.”^184 Of all those present, only Žujović—
apart from the members of the Politburo—had known about Stalin’s letter be-
fore the meeting, as he had been told about it by Lavrent’ev. On reading it, he
expressed approval that the problems had been communicated “in such a reso-
lute way,” though he doubted it would do any good. He counseled the Soviets:
“All efforts to improve relations will be obstructed. For this reason, the CPSU
must keep intervening (in the internal life of the CPY ).”^185
Žujović’s words at the CC meeting in the Old Palace heightened his com-
rades’ suspicions that he was a Soviet informer. Further decisive evidence came