The Postwar Period 213
the Second World War, two states had been created on the Korean peninsula,
one to the north under communist rule and one to the south under American
tutelage. When North Korea treacherously attacked the South, there was a
heated debate in the Security Council as to what measures to take. The United
States favored armed intervention by the UN in defense of South Korea, in-
tervention that the Soviets were unable to veto since they had boycotted the
Security Council when it refused to recognize the communist government in
Beijing as the legal representative of China. According to the Americans and
their allies, it was Chiang Kai-Shek who was entitled to this role. Because of the
absence of the Soviets, the American motion regarding South Korea was passed
with Yugoslavia abstaining from the vote on 26 June 1950.^326 The Yugoslav
representative, Aleš Bebler, informed his American colleagues that Belgrade
understood their decision but because of their ideological dispute with Mos-
cow, they could not approve the proposed resolution regarding intervention in
Korea.^327 The Americans were rather annoyed and reminded Tito that without
their help his country would not have had a seat on the Security Council.
He replied that Moscow would interpret his agreement of the armed defense
of Seoul as evident proof of his alliance with the West, and this could unleash
an attack of the Soviet Union and its satellites on Yugoslavia. When Mao’s
China intervened in the Korean War in November 1950, he changed his mind
and decided to support the United States. Mao’s commitment to the aggression
against South Korea generated suspicions in Belgrade that Moscow’s allies
might collaborate in an attack on the Balkans, as well. In Washington, too,
there was a growing concern that an attack on Yugoslavia was a serious pos-
sibility, since it was obvious that the elimination of the Tito “heresy” would
strengthen the Kremlin’s strategic and political position on the Danube and
in the Balkans. Aware of this, the marshal therefore supported the UN’s (i.e.,
Washington’s) action in Korea, stressing that, in case of a world war, he would
not stay neutral, but would fight against the Red Army.^328
The propagandistic activity of the Soviet bloc against Yugoslavia had two
peaks, one in the spring and summer of 1950 and a lesser one in November of
that same year during the first months of the Korean War. In a speech given in
Prague on 6 May 1950, on the anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia,
Nikolai A. Bulganin, member of the Politburo of the CPSU, declared: “The
Yugoslav people deserve a better fate, and the day when they will overthrow
the Fascist Tito-Ranković clique is probably not far away.”^329 Yugoslavia was
greatly alarmed and worried about the possibility of Soviet aggression. A sec-
ond moment of tension came the following November, when US President
Harry S Truman presented Congress with a legislative proposal relating to aid
for Yugoslavia. The Soviets reacted by saying that Yugoslavia was planning to