14 The Young Broz
were tainted by a hostile antagonism between Serbs and Croats. As Miroslav
Krleža wrote later, the discussion was entangled in the vicious circle of opposite
beliefs: “It is impossible to solve the national question without democracy,” or
“Without the solution of the national question there is no real democracy.”^39
From the middle of the twenties, the Executive Committee of the Comin-
tern (Ispolnitel’nyi komitet Kommunisticheskogo internationala; IKKI), con-
trolled by Moscow, considered the Kingdom SHS an “artificial creature of
Versailles” and a possible imperialist springboard for an attack against the
Soviet Union. It had to be dismembered so that a Federation of Socialist
Republics could be created on its ruins. In a resolution published in spring 1925,
the CPY received the following instructions: “The party has to convince the
working masses with all propaganda means at its disposal that the destruction
of such a State is the only way to solve the national question.... As long as
Yugoslavia does not disappear, no serious communist activity is possible.
Hence, Yugoslavia has to be destroyed, with the help of all separatist forces
present within it.”^40 This is why the IKKI attacked the right-wing faction and
its leader, Serb secretary general of the party Sima Marković, who was criti-
cized by Stalin himself for his adverse stance toward Lenin’s doctrine of
national self-determination. He was expelled from the CPY in 1929. But the
IKKI was also opposed to the left-wing faction, led by Rajko Ivanić, who
considered peasants inevitable allies of the bourgeoisie and therefore enemies
of the working class. In 1928, in an open letter to the members of the CPY, the
Comintern described the conflict raging between both groups in these terms:
“The vital questions of the proletarian struggle have been relegated to the last
place; first place has been taken by a scholastic dispute that only nurtures the
clashes between factions.”^41
Moscow’s interference in the internal quarrels of the CPY exacerbated
things. In this atmosphere the so-called “Zagreb line” prevailed, which asserted
that it was necessary to go beyond the factions, since they were nothing but
the skirmishes of intellectuals who should be replaced by workers at the head
of the party. Tito remembered later, “We tried to find a way out of a difficult
situation that the communist movement in Yugoslavia had to face. We knew
that it was necessary above all to repair the party and to achieve its unity.”
Naturally, this proposition was risky, considering that the leadership was prone
to inflict heavy sanctions on its critics, quickly claiming that they were “anti-
party elements.”^42
In the midst of these discussions, Josip Broz succeeded—not without mock-
ing opposition from those who considered him intellectually inferior—in
attaining the post of secretary of the City Committee in Zagreb at the end of
February 1928. The main candidate for this office had been Andrija Hebrang,