308 The Presidential Years
neo-colonialism, and imperialism. They were incapable, however, of proposing
any constructive initiatives for the solution to these world problems.^225 Tito’s re-
quest that the UN should organize a global summit on international economic
development, especially regarding the relations between the developed North
and the less-developed South, resulted in a series of initiatives by the non-
aligned that did not yield significant results. His idea about a “new mutual
economic order” that would help former colonial countries financially did not
take off as it found no support in either Washington or Moscow. The most the
conference was able to do was to send an invitation to Khrushchev and to the
newly elected US president, John F. Kennedy, to “start discussing the peace-
ful solution of contemporary issues,” since the “key to peace and war” was in
their hands.^226 The meeting was marked by a simmering disagreement between
the Yugoslavs and some of the participants, starting with Nehru. Whereas the
Yugoslavs wished for a solid organization that could participate in the inter-
national political arena, others like Nehru were more interested in loose dis-
cussions about important global issues, hoping to be able to mediate between
the great powers. How “friendly” the atmosphere was at the first meeting of
the non-aligned—a term that Tito avoided for a long time, preferring “non-
engaged”—is shown by the Yugoslav decision to secretly bug all the residences
of the foreign guests under the auspices of a particular operation called “Peace,”
authorized by the marshal himself.^227
The most delicate question confronted by the non-aligned was that of Ger-
many. Tito and Popović did everything possible to make sure that the con-
ference would recognize the existence of two German states, but to no avail,
because of the pressure exerted by the West on India and the countries under
its influence.^228 Nevertheless, in the end Yugoslavia was successful in burnish-
ing its image, thanks to its ability to organize such a complex diplomatic gath-
ering. From that moment on, Tito gained the status of a world statesman,
which he tried to exploit in internal policy too, as his contacts with the Third
World were unpopular among the masses, who tended to prefer the West,
which they perceived as less alien and more advanced. Answering his critics,
who of course never dared to speak loudly, he often stated that an array of
small, independent republics could never wield more influence than a federal
Yugoslavia, as he had created. This proved his case.^229 However, his “compre-
hension” of the Soviet nuclear test aroused much indignation in the West, and
raised questions concerning Yugoslavia’s relations with both blocs.^230 No one
suspected that the explanation given by the Yugoslav diplomats to Kennan
could have some basis in truth, because no one knew the real balance of power
beyond the Kremlin walls as well as the marshal. As early as February 1961,
during his trip to Africa, he had said about Khrushchev: “He is the best man