320 The Presidential Years
Ranković to act with the necessary prudence.^287 In his declarations, Tito also
started to move closer to the reformist forces gathered around Kardelj, Bakarić,
and their associates, and this was decisive. The result of the marshal’s gradual
passage from one camp to the other was the new constitution, adopted on 7
April 1963, in which the country assumed the name of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY ). It appeared to be a temporary compromise.
On the one hand it confirmed the role of the party in Yugoslav society, but on
the other hand it preserved the basic point of the Ljubljana congress and its
program: the pledge to self-management.^288
Ranković’s Pyrrhic VictoryRanković, pulling the strings as organizational secretary of the party since 1940,
was at first unaware how perilous Kardelj’s maneuver to isolate him truly was: he
did not consider the lofty words important, trusting his power to influence all
appointments of any importance. These appointments were not made on the
basis of a candidate’s real value, but on the judgment of the secret services. In
spite of his enormous authority, Ranković tried to further strengthen his posi-
tion, vying for the office of state vice-president as a reward for his acceptance
of the constitution. He received it at the last moment, at Tito’s explicit request.^289
Kardelj was furious. He did not have to read the Washington Post, which
named Ranković as the recognized successor, to be aware of his perilous situa-
tion. “Ranković now is second to Tito in both party and government,” wrote
the CIA agents, “and his erstwhile competitor, Kardelj, has slipped after a pro-
longed period of political eclipse; many of the government functions he pre-
viously exercised will now be handled by Ranković. Thus Tito has been able to
do what Khrushchev has not—to establish a clear heir apparent.”^290
They did not take into account that the marshal was not ready to relinquish
control over the country, or to allow personalities too similar to his own into his
entourage. Neither did they consider his wife, Jovanka, who was unwilling to
tolerate anyone too authoritative at the court.^291
Tito’s first maneuvers against Ranković were prudent. Rumors reverberated,
for instance, around Tito’s decision in 1963 to fire the chief of the military coun-
terintelligence service (Kontraobaveštajna služba; KOS), General Jefto Šašić,
one of Ranković’s friends. On the advice of Ivan Krajačić (Stevo, the Croatian
éminence grise), his post was taken over by another Croat, Ivan Mišković,
who until then had led the military police. Mišković’s hands were notoriously
blood-stained: after the 1945 victory, he had been involved as chief of the
People’s Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (Korpus Narodne Odbrane Jugoslavije)
of the Third Army, and was responsible for the massacres of the Ustaša and
Domobrani.^292